Contesting the Burlington Northern\u27s Proposed Rail Line Abandonments: Advocacy on Behalf of the Shipper in the Staggers Rail Act Era by Thompson, David C.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 58 Number 2 Article 2 
1982 
Contesting the Burlington Northern's Proposed Rail Line 
Abandonments: Advocacy on Behalf of the Shipper in the 
Staggers Rail Act Era 
David C. Thompson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thompson, David C. (1982) "Contesting the Burlington Northern's Proposed Rail Line Abandonments: 
Advocacy on Behalf of the Shipper in the Staggers Rail Act Era," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 58 : No. 2 , 
Article 2. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol58/iss2/2 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
SPECIAL PROJECT
CONTESTING THE BURLINGTON NORTHERN'S
PROPOSED RAIL LINE ABANDONMENTS: ADVOCACY
ON BEHALF OF THE SHIPPER IN THE STAGGERS RAIL
ACT ERA
I. INTRODUCTION
Shippers of grain and other freight by railroad in North
Dakota have become inescapably aware in recent years that the
future of branch line service on many lines in the state is uncertain.
Rail carriers have perceived a shift in federal regulatory policy in
favor of the railroad industry and have become eager to rid their
systems of branch lines on which deficit or marginally profitable
operations are being maintained. A ripening of this trend by.June
of 1981 was shown with the announcement by North Dakota's
largest rail carrier, the Burlington Northern, that some 1,200 miles
of its branch lines were the subject of various stages of
abandonment preparation.' Although imminent abandonment of
some of these lines was postponed by the railroad in a conciliatory
move on November 24, 1981,2 the Burlington Northern continues
to view these properties as having a marginal future. While some of
this trackage unquestionably is in poor condition, is patronized
1. Burlington N.R.R., Press Release (June 26, 1981). The actual lines proposed for
abandonment with the filing of the railroad's 1981 System Map Diagram were listed in explanatory
material submitted with the press release. Id. See infra note 29 for a discussion of Burlington
Northern's advertising campaign to promote support for rail abandonment plans.
2. Burlington N.R.R., Press Release (Nov. 24, 1981) (railroad announced plans to slightly
scale back its immediate rail abandonment plans). See inra note 21.
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lightly, and is substantially duplicated by other lines in the areas it
serves, there are other routes proposed for abandonment for which
there are no practical substitutes, rail or otherwise.
This project will examine the principles underpinning rail
abandonment law and offer legal strategies with which to contest
abandonments of lines that impose little proportionate burden on a
carrier to keep in operation, but which are vital to the economic
health of rural regions and communities in North Dakota.
II. THE PROPOSED RAIL LINE ABANDONMENTS
According to the 1980 State Rail Plan for North Dakota, 3 the
state has approximately 5,000 miles of rail track traversing its
surface; approximately sixty percent is branchline right-of-way.4
Prior to 1976, shippers and other interested parties in North
Dakota had not envisioned the possibility that a major rail line
abandonment problem would soon confront the state.' From 1930
to 1974, the miles of operated railroad in North Dakota dropped
only 3.3 percent, from 5,260 miles to 5,079 miles. 6 In August of
1976, however, the United States Secretary of Transportation,
articulating a policy that was eventually to find its way into the
offices of the Interstate Commerce Commission, declared that
more than half the rail line in North Dakota was "light density in
character" and as unprofitable trackage, was subject to eventual
abandonment.7 It was at this point that freight shippers and state
officials became aware that up to 2,500 miles of tail line in North
Dakota could be abandoned within the next several years."
In succeeding years, a progressively greater number of rail
miles have been made subject to abandonment. In 1979
3. NORTH DAKOTA STATE HIGHWAY DEP'T, [hereinafter cited as STATE RAIl PLAN OF 19801. This
plan was compiled by the Intermodel Planning and Rail Assistance Division of the North Dakota
State Highway Department, the designated state agency for rail planning in North Dakota, and the
Upper Great Plains Transportation Institute at North Dakota State University. The preparation of
the plan was financed by the Federal Railroad Administration of the United States Department of
Transportation with funds made available through the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory
Reform Act. Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (1976) (codified at 45 U.S.C.A. § 801-803, 821-837,
851-855 (West Supp. 1981)). By providing statistical data with respect to operating costs, capital
needs, and traffic in North Dakota rail lines, the plan offers a factual basis upon which protestants to
a particular rail abandonment can rely. The plan also discusses alternatives to rail freight service for
each line which a carrier has either designated for imminent abandonment or those classified as being
"under study" for possible future abandonment. See STATE RAIL PLAN OF 1980.
4. STATE RAIL PLAN OF 1980, at 1-3.
5. Id. The introductory chapter of the 1980 North Dakota State Rail Plan states that "prior to
1976, North Dakota hadn't even envisioned the possibility of a major branchline abandonment
problem facing the state." Id.





approximately 540 miles of track were subject to abandonment;
that total increased to 840 miles in 1980.9 When Burlington
Nothern President Richard Grayson stated in March of 1981 that
almost one-third of the state's branch lines might be identified in
1981 for abandonment within the following three years, it became
evident that the carrier's policy of abandoning unprofitable or
marginally profitable lines was being accelerated. 10
The Burlington Northern's 1981 System Map11  showed
roughly 1,200 miles of branchline in North Dakota subject to
abandonment. 12 Included in that total were 478 miles of line in the
state that were classified by Burlington Northern in "Category
One,'' 13 meaning that the carrier intended to seek permission from
the ICC to effect abandonment within three years of the system
map's filing date. 14 Approximately 725 more miles of track were
placed in "Category Two" by Burlington Northern,"5 indicating
that the railroad had these lines "under study" for possible future
filing of abandonment applications with the Commission. 16 Thus,
the proposed abandonments in North Dakota were part of an
overall corporate policy by the Burlington Northern to cut 4,166
miles of branch line trackage by 1983. The states most affected
would be North Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Washington. 17
On November 24, 1981, the Burlington Northern filed an
amendment 8 to its 1981 System Map in which the carrier set forth
a plan to scale back slightly some of its line abandonment
proposals. 19 In letters sent on that date to the governors of North
9. Id.
10. See The Forum, June 4, 1981, at 9, col. 1-2; Grand Forks Herald, June 18, 1981, at 1,
col. 1-3 (Farm and Home section).
11. Amendment of the System Diagram Map, 49 C.F.R. S 1121.23(c) (1980) (requirement for
filing System Diagram Map).
12. See 1981 Burlington N.R.R. Amended System Diagram Map (filed with the ICC and the
North Dakota Pub. Service Comm'n,.June 26, 1981) (explanatory material). A formal listing of lines
in various abandonment categories was made at the time that the system map was filed. Id.
13. 49 C.F.R. S 1121.20(b)(l) (1980). Section 1121.20(b)(1) defines "Category One" as "[aill
lines or portions of lines which the carrier anticipates will be the subject of an abandonment or
discontinuance application to be filed within the 3-year period following the date upon which the
diagram, or any amended diagram, is filed with the Commission." Id.14. Id. §§ I1121.20(b)(1), (c)(1). See inifra notes 60-70.
15. Id. 5 1121.20(b)(2). Section 1121.20(b)(2) "Category Two" lines include "faIll lines or
portions of lines potentially subject to abandonment ... those which the carrier has under study and
believes may be the subject of future abandonment application because of either anticipated
operating losses or excessive rehabilitation costs, as compared to potential revenues." Id.
16. Id.
17. 1981 Burlington N.R.R. Amended System Diagram Map (filed.June 26, 1981) (explanatory
material). See BN Envisions Abandoning 4,000 Miles qfRailroad, TRAFIC WORLD, June 15, 1981, at 25.
18. 49 C.F. R. 1121.23(a) (1980). S.ection 1-121.23 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides
that "lelach carrier shall be responsible for maintaining the continuing accuracy of its system
diagram map and the accompanying line descriptions .... Amendments may be filed at any time
and will be subject to all carrier filing and publication requirements of § 1121.22 as they apply to the
amendment and each individual line which has been amended." Id.
19. 1981 Burlington N.R.R. Amended Diagram Map (filed with the ICC, Nov. 24, 1981). See
Official Statement of Burlington N.R.R., BNto Scale Back Branch Line Plans (Nov, 24, 1981). The text
of the statement in its entirety is as follows:
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Dakota, Nebraska, and Montana, 20 Burlington Northern President
and Chief Executive Officer Richard B. Grayson said that branch
line mileage projected for "Category One" would be reduced,21
and that several lines placed in "Category Two," under study for
possible future abandonment, had been placed in "Category
Five," denoting their return to "normal operating status.'' 22 An
official statement issued by the company on the day that the letters
were sent explained the slight moderation of the railroad's
abandonment policy from the June position:
[Slome of the lines after a thorough study and
[examination] of future traffic projections with shippers
appear to be financially viable for the foreseeable future .
Following months of meetings with shippers and state rail planners, Burlington
Northern Railroad will scale back its plan to curtail operations on some branch lines in
Nebraska, North Dakota and Montana.
In letters sent to the governors of each of the three states, BN Railroad President
and Chief Executive Officer Richard C. Grayson said today that the branch line
mileage projected for abandonment (Category 1) in the three states during the next
three years will be reduced.
In addition, several branch lines placed in the "under study" category (Category
2) when BN filed its amended svstem diagram map with the Interstate Commerce
Commission in June. will be returned to normal operating status (Category 5).
Gravson said some of the lines, after a thorough study and analysis, and after looking
at future traffic projections with shippers, appear to be financially viable for the
forseeable future.
Grayson reminded the governors that the thrust of the company's branch line
program was "to be open in our evaluation of the long-term viability of our branch
lines" and to seek cooperation and coinmunication from those along the afllcted lines.
"Mans' shippers and state rail planners took the time to sit down with us to
discuss the future of specific branch lines," Grayson said. "As a result of these
meetings. and the continuing analysis of our branch lines, the status of many of the
lines will be changed."
Grayson said that in tmany cases shippers on a branch line made a commitment o
increase their use of the line and disclosed plans for new grain elevators and
subterminals.
The rail president emphasized that the analysis of branch lines is a continuing
one. "The outlook for those lines remanining in the 'under study' category (Category
2) is marginal." he said. Many' face a downward trend in traffic or substantial
rehabilitation costs in the near futir' and Grayson said that commitments from
shippers will be needed to save those lines.
Grayson also said. however, that when a line's future justifies the cost of
upgrading the line to carry heavier loads. "we intend to proceed with that upgrading
using Burlington Northern funds. "
The governors were told that BN is committed to providing each state with
"efficient, modern rail service in the years ahead."
BN continues to study and analyze branch lines in other states, Grayson said.
ld,
20. See Official Statement of Burlington N.R.R.. BAI to Scale Back Branch Line Plans (Nos'. 24.
1982).
21. See 1981 Burlington N.R.R. Amended System Diagram Map (filed with the ICC and the
North Dakota Pub. Service Comm'n June 26, 1981). There were six branch lines or parts thereof
which 'ere transferred from Category One to other category stages in the abandonment process as a
result of the November 24, 1981 amendment by Burlington Northern of its system diagram map. Id.
22. Rail branch lines in "Category Five" are those described as "faill other lines or portions of
lines which the carrier owns and operates . . ." 49 C.F.R. § 1121.20(b)(5) (1980). Thus. lines in
"Category Five" on a carrier's system diagram map are those for which there are no present plans
lbr abandonment.
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. . .[1n many cases, shippers on a branch line made a
commitment to increase their use of the line and disclosed
plans for new grain elevators and subterminals.23
Despite the November changes, however, Burlington
Northern emphasized that it considered the economic outlook for
those lines remaining in the "under study" category (Category
Two) to be "marginal" at best. 24 In addition, two branch lines that
had been classified in the June 1981 System Map filing as being
under study for possible future abandonment were moved into
"Category One" in the November system map changes. 25
Essentially, Burlington Northern had engaged in only slight
moderation of its aggressive abandonment policy, since the
November filing caused only six of the lines previously in
"Category One" to be transferred out of that classification. 26 The
marginal long-term significance of the November system map
modifications made by Burlington Northern is illustrated by ICC
regulations that allow a rail carrier to modify its system map at any
time. 27 Consequently the railroad may at any time add as many
branch lines as it wishes to "Category One," following the date of
the submission of the amended system map. 28 The Burlington
Northern has acknowledged that the great increase in its rail line
abandonment applications last year was attributable to the fact that
1981 was the first year in which carriers had been able to take
advantage of features of the Staggers Rail Act relating to
abandonments. 29
23. Official Statement of Burlington N.R.R.. BN to Scale Back Branch Line Plans (Nov. 24, 1981).
24. Id.
25. See 1981 Burlington N.RR. Amended System Diagram Maps (filed with the ICC,.June 26,
Nov. 24, 1981). These lines were the segments front Linton, North Dakota to Eureka, South Dakota
and that portion of the Grand Forks-Grafton line from Grand Forks to Honeyford, North Dakota. Sce
id.
26. See 1981 Burlington N. R.R. Amended System Diagram Map (filed with the ICC, Nov. 24,
1981). These lines were the routes from Milnor to Oakes, North Dakota; Hannaford to Binford,
.North D)kota: Towner to Newburg, North Dakota: Devils Lake to Hansboro, North Dakota;
Sanbhorn to Hannaford. North Dakota and Zap to Killdeer, North Dakota. See id. See also supra note
21.
27. See 49 C.F.R. S 1121.23(a) (1980). Section 1121.23(a) provides that "[almendments [to a
system diagram mapi may be filed at any time and will be subject to all carrier filing and
publication requirements of § 1121.22 as they apply to the amendment and each individual line
which has been amended." Id.
28. Id.
29. Burlington N.R.R., press release (June 26, 1981) (issued by Michael Wenninger, Regional
Public Relations Mngr., Twin Cities Region of the Burlington N.R.R.)(Branch Line Fact Sheet).
In succeeding months, the Burlington Northern engaged in a slick public relations campaign to
promote support for its rail abandonment plans. The campaign was highlighted by large
advertisements placed in North Dakota newspapers. In one such advertisement a picture of a
decaying branch line appeared with a dilapidated grain elevator in the background. Grand Forks
Herald, Aug. 27, 1981, at 7A, col. 2-5, The ad begins in large type and states the following: "In
1881. this track was worth its weight in gold. Today, every farmer in North Dakota is losing money
because of it." Id. Under the picture, which features high prairie weeds growing over the right-of-
way, the BN message continued:
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The Staggers Rail Act, effective as of October 14, 1980,
contains several provisions that serve to speed up the process
through which rail carriers receive approval from the ICC to
abandon lines. 30 The essence of the modifications is that the ICC is
now required to render a final decision on an application within
prescribed time periods, and opportunities for protestants to
oppose and delay rail abandonments have been minimized. 31
Before discussing the Staggers Rail Act, it is important to briefly
examine some of the developments that preceded its enactment.
In the official report issued by the House Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee, the economic health of the
American railroad industry was described at great length. With one
finding in the report being that roughly thirty percent of the
nation's rail business was being conducted by "financially weak
carriers," the Committee asserted that various changes of
operating climate were necessary for the industry to regain its
strength. 32 Despite the classification of the remaining seventy
percent of rail business as being conducted by healthy carriers, the
Committee justified a substantial decrease in governmental
regulation of the industry by finding that rail business conducted by
weak carriers actually affects all rail carriers. That conclusion was
made on the basis that approximately seventy percent of all rail
traffic is at some point interchanged between two or more
railroads. 33
Viewing the evil of excessive rate and route regulation over
rail carriers, the Staggers Rail Act restructured railroad rate reg-
ulation in general and accelerated the abandonment process for the
stated purpose of permitting railroad corporations to realize a
When Burlington Northern's branch lines were built a century ago, they opened doors
to new markets. And that meant better prices for farmers. Ironically, in order for
farmers to get better prices today, we need to close some of these lines. The cost to
rehabilitate track is about $100,000 per mile. Ifa line carries only a handful of cars a
year, that's clearly inefficient and unprofitable. For us. And for you. By closing sonic
of these little-used branch lines, we can consolidate out resources and energy to
improve the single most efficient form of grain transportation today - the unit grain
train. The lines we will be closing over the next few years account for only a small
percentage of the grain shipped by Burlington Northern in North Dakota Yet the
savings will be millions of dollars. These funds are being redirected into unit train
operations, resulting in improved services and lower shipping rates. And that's
something every farmer in North Dakota can profit from.
id.
30. The Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, tit. 1I, § 402(a), 94 Stat. 1928 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101-11917 (West 1981)).
31.49 U.S.C.A. §, 10903, 10904 (West 1981).
32. H.R. RFP. No. 1035. 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 111-12, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Cone. CoN. & An.
Ne.ws 3978, 4055-56 (House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee discussed the economic
health of the American railroad industry).
33. Id.
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greater percentage rate of return on investment. 34 Pointing out that
the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976
(4R Act) 3 5 had required the ICC to determine the adequate rate of
return that should be realized 1 the industry, the House
Committee report accompanying the Staggers Rail Act stated that
over the preceding decade, American railroads had failed to reach
the eleven percent rate of return established as the adequate rate by
the Commission. 36 Asserting that "[tihere is no better measure of
overall financial conditions than the rate of return on
investment,'' 3 7 the House report explained that the statutory
changes needed to deregulate the industry and improve the
business climate for railroads were contained in the legislative
package.38
Most of the changes in rail abandonment procedures brought
about by the Staggers Rail Act were changes that the industry
lobbying organization, the American Association of Railroads
(AAR), had been pushing for during the preceding several years.3 9
A support document used by the AAR in its lobbying activities as
Congress considered the legislation in 1979, provided that the
industry should be allowed to quickly abandon lines that carry little
traffic or operate at a loss. 40 The AAR had reasoned that if the rail
industry was to continue as a viable business, it must be allowed to
operate as a business, unconstrained by restrictive abandonment
34. Id. at 101-19, CODE CONG. &AD. NEws at 4045-63.
35. Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (1976) (codified at 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-803. 821-837, 851-
855 (West Supp. 1981)).
36. H.R. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 96, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CoNe. & AD.
NEWS 3978, 4040.
37. Id. at 97, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4041.
38. Id. at 34-35, U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3979-80. The House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce stated the following:
The Committee is concerned about the plight of the railroad industry. In 1978,
the Department of Transportation in its report to Congress - "A Prospectus For
Change In the Freight Railroad Industry" - concluded that the industry between
1976 and 1985 would have a capital shortfall of between 13.1 and 16.1 billion
dollars .... Current earnings of the railroad industry are inadequate to meet existing
or anticipated capital needs. There is no reason to believe that railroads operating in
the present regulatory environment will improve their earnings.
Id.
39, See id. at 99-113, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4043-57. Most of the statistics with
respect to questions of railroads' return on net investment, rate of return and cost of capital, and
projected future investment requirements were supplied to Congress by the American Association of
Railroads (AAR) in the course of its lobbying activities. In the supporting documents made part of
the official legislative history of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895, the
AAR statistics were adopted by the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee and the
Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee in their official reports. See H.R. REP.
No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 99-113, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 3978, 4043-
57.
40. Ass'N OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, ECONOMic REGULATION OF RAIL FREIGHT OPERATIONS (Feb.
5, 1979).
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procedures and rate regulation. 4' The AAR contended that the cost
and time necessary to pursue an abandonment were far too high to
be sustained in the process of justifying the elimination of a
marginal or unprofitable line. 42
The contentions by the railroad industry won favor in
Congress, as the House Committee majority report accompanying
the Staggers Rail Act provided:
The Committee has observed the deteriorating
conditions of America's branch lines. An enormous
amount of time, effort, and expense has been expended
contesting abandonments.
This program [under the Act] has the advantage of
avoiding expensive protracted litigation. It provides the
carrier desiring to abandon a line a vehicle for prompt
abandonment.4 3
This general policy in favor of a streamlined abandonment
procedure, however, was not intended to create for the railroads the
facility of ICC "rubber-stamping" of abandonment applications.
Certificates of public convenience and necessity issued by the ICC
are still required as a condition precedent to permissible
abandonment of a rail line. 44 In addition, there was no deletion of
the express statutory direction that the ICC, in considering
abandonment applications, be required to consider whether the
proposal would have a serious adverse impact on "rural or
community development. "45 This was despite a Carter
Administration effort to have the language removed from the
statute. 46 Nevertheless, the majority of members of the ICC appear
to have interpreted these legislative developments as a policy
mandate that virtually any abandonment application filed by a
41, Id. Note, Proposed Re4ulatory Reform in the Area of Railroad Abandonment, II TRANSP. L..1. 213,
221 (1979).
42. ASS'N OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF RAIL FREIGHT OPERATIONS 2
(Feb. 5, 1979).
43. H.R. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3988.
44. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10903(a) (West 1981). Section 10903(a) provides the following: "A rail
carrier providing transportation . . . may . . . abandon any part of its railroad lines . . . only if the
Commission [the ICCI finds that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or
permit the abandonment or discontinuance." Id.
45. Id.
46. See Note, Proposed Re~ulatory Reform in the Area qf Railroad Abandonment, 11 TRANSP. L... 213
(1979). The author discusses the Carter Administration's support for a bill which would have
removed the requirement that the Interstate Commerce Commission, when finding that public
convenience and necessity require or permit a rail line abandonment, must consider whether the
abandonment will have a serious, adverse impact in rural and community development. Id. at 219.
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carrier should be granted. 47
Congress had reasoned that since thirty percent of the nation's
railroads were "financially weak," drastic deregulatory action had
to be taken in order to protect profitable railroads from the
bankruptcy that befell the seven Northeastern railroads and
prompted the creation of the deficit-ridden Consolidated Rail
Corporation. 48 Expressing fear that the remainder of the nation's
rail system eventually could rest in the hands of bankrupt carriers,
section III of the House Conference Report4 9 provides that one of
the specific goals of the legislation was to reform federal regulation
"to preserve a safe, adequate, economical, efficient, and financially
stable rail system" and "assist the rail system to remain in the
private sector of the economy. ''50 In the House Committee report
accompanying the Staggers Rail Act, the example of the seven
bankrupt Northeastern railroads was cited as justification for the
changes affected by the Act. 5'
This rationale has been applied in abandonment pro-
ceedings by the majority of current ICC members, even in
situations in which the proposed abandonment involved relatively
minor losses in revenue for a profitable carrier such as the
Burlington Northern.52 Appropriate circumstances are now
necessary to convince the ICC not to allow a particular
abandonment. Such a profile would exist where the proposed
abandonment would cause great proportionate hardship to shippers
and communities, but would in turn be minimally burdensome to
the carrier and to interstate commerce in general, the ICC may be
persuaded not to allow the abandonment.
While some lines proposed by the Burlington Northern for
abandonment or future abandonment are redundant or are
presently little-used, there are others whose abandonment will
cause significant economic hardship. 53 Discussing the serious
47. See infra note 212.
48. H.R. REP. No. 1035. 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 99. reprinted in 1980 U.S. COr. CoN;. & ADn
N Ews 3978. 4043.
49. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1430, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 79-80, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CoNe.
& AD. NEss 4110.
50. Id.
51. H.R. Rp. No 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CoDE CON_. & AD.
NEwss 3978, 3981-82.
52. The rail operations of Burlington Northern Inc. are indeed profitable. See BuRLINGTON
N.R.R., ANNUA. REPORT (1980). In the report the company acknowledged that a major
development that will enhance the profit of its railroad was the enactment by Congress of the
Staggers Rail Act of 1980. According to the report, the Act affords the company "streamlined
procedures for line abandonments" and "greater freedom to set freight rates." Id. But even the 1980
figures, which do not begin to reflect the bonanzas of the Staggers Act for BN, are impressive profit
statistics. The pre-tax income of the railroad rose 319% from $39,000,000 in 1979 to $165,000,000 in
1980. Id. Revenue in dollars increased 23% from $2,636,000,000 in 1979 to $3,254,000,000 in 1980,
and revenue ton miles rose 15% from 135 miles in 1979 to 155 in 1980. Id.
53. Id. See NORTH DAKOTA HIIItWAY DEP'T, STATE RAiL. PtLAN UPDATF app. (1981) 1hereinafter
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effects which will accrue from the abandonment of lines in North
Dakota, the 1980 North Dakota State Rail Plan provides:
North Dakota is particularly dependent on rail
transportation. The state is the nation's largest producer
of spring wheat, durum wheat, barley, rye, and flaxseed,
typically shipping to market in the area of 350 million to
400 million bushels of grain. North Dakota produces this
grain in the center of the North American continent
requiring long hauls to reach its major markets. North
Dakota with no navigable waterways has only one other
alternative to market its grain, trucks capable of carrying
approximately 800 bushels of wheat. However, due to the
long haul advantage of railroads and marketing factors
railroad transportation is the preferred mode. 5 4
Shippers in North Dakota maintain that shipping grain long
distances by truck simply is not economically feasible. This fact was
recognized by the Burlington Northern in the press release it issued
with its notification of those lines that were to be subject to
abandonment as of June 1981.15 The company stated flatly that
"rail is the best for the long haul of grain. ,,56
It is ironic to consider the words of then U.S. Deputy Under
Secretary of Transportation, John W. Snow, as he promoted
railroad deregulation in.June of 1975:
A fourth myth is that one result of our reforms will be
denial of transportation services to thousands of smaller
communities. Chairman Stafford told a House committee
that among the costs of our rail bill was loss of service to
remote areas. This argument is bottomed on the premise
that it is unprofitable for carriers to serve smaller
communities or small shippers and that such service is
presently subsidized by more profitable routes . . . . In
fact, we have seen little evidence that there is a geographic
cross-subsidy in the rail and motor carrier industries. Far
from promoting the interest of rural areas or small
cited as 1981 STATE RAIL PLAN UPDATE]. The 1980 North Dakota State Rail Plan and the North
Dakota State Rail Plan Update provide a line-by-line description of the effects projected to accrue in
the event that a particular rail line in the state is in fact abandoned by the Burlington Northern.
54. STATE RAIL PtAN OF 1980, supra note 3, at 111-2.
55. Burlington N.R.R., Press Release (June 26, 1981) (issued by Michael Wenninger, Regional
Public Relations Mngr., Twin Cities Region).
56. Id. (Branch Line Fact Sheet).
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shippers, the present system provides an incentive for
carriers to skimp on service.57
Although the previous regulatory constraints might have provided
an incentive for carriers to minimize their losses "either by
discouraging service or by providing poor service," ' 58  the
alternative of an almost automatic rail abandonment approval
under the present ICC practice is of no service at all for many small
and rural communities.
Despite the legislative history of the Act, 59 rail abandonment
proceedings were not intended by Congress to become meaningless
exercises in which the ICC approves an application without
seriously holding the petitioning carrier to its burden of proving
that necessity and public convenience require or permit such
abandonment. Thus, even within the context of the broad policy
articulated by Congress to facilitate an economically viable railroad
industry in the private sector, effective and legitimate opposition
still may be mounted to proposed abandonments in cases in which
the effects to the area served are great and the burdens of keeping
the line in operation are correspondingly minor for the carrier to
sustain.
III. THE PROCEDURAL PROCESS FOR RAIL ABAN-
DONMENT APPLICATIONS
Under the provisions of 49 U.S.C.A. 5 10903 (a), a rail carrier
may-abandon a line only if the ICC determines that release of a line
and cessation of the operations on it will be consistent with
"present and future public convenience and necessity.' '60 The
57. 42 I.C.C. PRACT... 731. 742 (1975)(remarks of John W. Snow. then Deputy Under Sec. of
Transp., at the 46th Annual Meeting of the Ass'n of ICC Practitioners, Atlanta, Georgia, onjune
18. 1975).
58. Id.
59. Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified at scattered sections
of49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101-11917 (West 1981)).
60. 49 U.S.C.A. S 10903(a)(2) (West 1981). With respect to railroads that are subject to
reorganization and bankruptcy proceedings, the authority of the ICC to review rail line
abandonment applications is advisory only. See 11 U.S.C.A. S 1170 (West 1979 & Supp. 1981). The
bankruptcy court, after notice and hearing, may authorize the abandonment of a particular rail line.
Id. § 1170(a) (West 1979). Although the statute provides that notice be provided to the ICC that the
line has been proposed for abandonment, the bankruptcy trustee makes its proposal to the court, and
the court in turn may approve the abandonment even if the commission should oppose it. Id.
1170(c). All the court must find is that the abandonment is in the best interest of the debtor railroad's
estate, is essential to the reorganization plan, and is consistent with public interest. Id. § 1170(a).
Actual abandonment, however, may not take place until the time for filing appeals has been
exhausted. Id. S 1170(d)(1). The rationale for this latter requirement is that railroad abandonments
by their nature are drastic developments in that once a rail line has been abandoned, it is gone. For a
further discussion of the statutory and regulatory framework applicable to bankrupt rail carriers, see
Thorns, New Rules.for Bankrupt Rails, TRAINS MAGAZINE, May 1980, at 28.
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burden of proof of establishing public convenience and necessity
rests with the party applying to the Commission for permission to
effect the abandonment."'
The ICC may approve the carrier's application as filed or it
may modify the terms under which abandonment will be
permitted. 62 Once the ICC finds that the abandonment of a line
satisfies this standard, it issues the carrier a certificate formally
approving the application. 63
The first indication that a carrier is considering a line for
abandonment is when that carrier files a complete and current rail
system diagram with the ICC in a procedure mandated by
statute. 64 Under regulations of the Commission that accompany the
statute, every carrier must include in this diagram a map of its
entire rail system, designating each line in one of four color-coded
categories. 65 In the first classification, lines or portions thereof that
the carrier anticipates will be subjects of abandonment applications
to be filed within the following three-year period appear on the
diagram in red ink. 66 The second category of routes, designated in
green ink, includes those that the carrier "has under study and
believes may be the subject of a future abandonment application
because of either anticipated operating losses or excessive
rehabilitation costs, as compared to potential revenues.'' 67 Rail
lines of the third type are those for which an abandonment
application is pending before the ICC on the date upon which the
diagram is filed with the agency. 68 These lines are denoted by
yellow ink. 69 All other lines that the carrier owns and operates,
either directly or through a designee, are shown on the system map
in black ink.70
Compliance by a carrier with these regulations relating to the
system diagram can be significant in determining whether an
abandonment will be allowed. If an abandonment application is
opposed by state or local government officials, shippers, or others
making "significant use" of the line, the ICC may not approve the
application unless the particular rail line has been identified
properly on a diagram map filed with the Commission at least four
61. 49 U.SC.A. § 10904(d)(1) (West 1981).
62. Id. § 10903(b)(1)(A)(i)(ii).
63. Id. § 10903(b)(2).
64. Id. § 10904(a).
65. 49 C. F. R. § I1121.20(c)(I )-(5).
66. Id. § 1121.20(b)(I)(c)(1).
67. Id. § 1121.20(b)(2).
68. Id. § 1121.20(b)(3).
69. Id. § 1121.20(c)(3).
70. Id. § 1121.20(b)(5), (c)(5).
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months prior to the filing date of the application.71 Under an
amendment to the statute made by the Staggers Rail Act, 72
however, a carrier's compliance with the system map requirements
may be waived by the ICC if the carrier making an abandonment
application is in bankruptcy." While ICC regulations provide that
each carrier is responsible for maintaining the continuing accuracy
of its system diagram map, 74 any carrier that has submitted a
diagram listing one or more lines under study for possible future
abandonment must revise its diagram annually, filing the updated
map with the Commission no later than June 30th of each year. 75
Once a carrier decides to seek abandonment of a line, its first
step in the administrative process is to serve notice of its intent to
file an abandonment application. 76 Service is accomplished by
means of certified letter to the ICC or by personal service to those
freight shippers who are "significant users ' 77 of the line proposed
for abandonment. 78 Notification must also be given to the Federal
Railroad Administration, the Department of Defense, the
Department of Interior, the Railroad Retirement Board, the
Railroad Labor Executives Association, and the Governor and
public utility agency of each state in which all or part of the railroad
proposed for abandonment is situated. 79 Additional notice is
required in the form of a legal notice published at least once during
each of three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in each county in which any part of the line proposed to
be abandoned is located.80 The form of the notice is set forth in
detail by ICC regulations and must be completed within thirty
71. 49 U.S.C.A. 5 10904(e)(3) (West 1981). Section 10904(e)(3) provides that determination of
whether a shipper or other person has made "significant use" of a rail line is left to the ICC for
administrative rulemaking. Id. The term "significant user" is deemed to include each of the 10 rail
patrons who originated and/or received the largest number of carloads (or each patron if there are
less than 10). 49 C.F.R. § 1121.11(M) (1980). Furthermore, any other rail patron is deemed a
"significant user" if that patron. received 50 or more carloads, on the line proposed for
abandonment, during the 12-month period preceding the month in which notice is given of the
abandonment application. Id.
72. Pub. L. No. 96-448, tit. IV, S 402(b), 94 Stat. 1941-42, (1980) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A.
10904(e)(3)(B) (West 1981)).
73. Id.
74. 49 C.F.R. 5 1121.23(a) (1980). Section 1121.23(a) provides the following:
Each carrier shall be responsible for maintaining the continuing accuracy of its
system diagram map and the accompanying line descriptions. Each carrier shall also
prepare and submit to the Commission a black-and-white version of the system
diagram map and accompanying line descriptions which clearly identify each of these
categories of line and are suitable for publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER.
Id
75. Id. 5 1121.23(a), (c).
76. Id. 5 1121.30.
77. Id. S 1121.30(a)(1).
78. Id.
79. Id. 5 1121.30(a)(2).
80. Id. 5 1121.30(a)(3).
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days.81
Once the notice requirements are satisfied, the carrier may
proceed to file its application for a certificate of abandonment with
the ICC while simultaneously filing a "notice of intent to
abandon. ",82 This latter action should be distinguished from the
carrier's earlier notice of intent to file the application for
abandonment.
In filing the application for a certificate of abandonment, the
carrier is required by statute to include four things: an accurate
summary of the petition; an explanation of the reasons for the
proposed abandonment; 83  a statement indicating that each
interested person is entitled to recommend to the ICC that it
approve, deny, or take other action concerning the application; 84
and a statement that the line is available for subsidy or sale and
'0,11d dierefore remain in service. 85 The notice requirements for a
carrier actually applying for the certificate to abandon include the
following: Certified mail notice to the Governor of each state that
would be directly affected by the proposed abandonment; 86 posting
of a copy of the notice in each terminal or station along the line
proposed for abandonment; 87 and newspaper publication for three
consecutive weeks in each county in which a portion of the line is
located.8 8 As for shippers, the statute directs the carrier merely to
"mail a copy of the notice, to the extent practicable, to all shippers
that have made significant use ... of the railroad line during the 12
,nonths preceding the filing of the application. "89
Involvement in administrative proceedings by opponents of a
proposed abandonment is limited by statutory amendments made
by the Staggers Rail Act. 90 Under prior law, any "interested
person" 9 1 could oppose a proposed abandonment by filing a
petition with the ICC requesting that the application be
investigated by the Commission, and the agency was thereby
required to undertake an investigation. 92 With the change effected
81. Id. §§ 1121.30(b), .31.
82. Id. § 1121.30(b). See49 U.S.C.A. 5 10904 (a)(1), (2)(A), (B), (C)(West 1981).
83.49 U.S.C.A. 5 10904(a)(2)(A)(West 1981).
84. Id. § 10904(a)(2)(B).
85. Id. § 10904(a)(2)(C)(i).
86. Id. § 10904(a)(3)(A).
87. Id. S 10904(a)(3)(B).
88. Id. S 10904(a)(3)(C).
89. Id. S 10904(a)(3)(D).
90. Pub. L. No. 96-448, tit. IV, 5 402(b), 94 Stat. 1941 (1980). See 46 Fed. Reg. 45348 (1981)
(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 1121.36) (defining role of"interested person").
91. 49 U.S.C.S. § 10904(c)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1979), amended by 49 U.S.C.A. S 10904(c)(1) (West
1981). That section read in part: "[Tihe Commission shall, on petition, and may, on its own




by the Staggers Rail Act, however, the ICC is no longer required to
undertake an investigation of the application for abandonment of a
railroad line even if it has been petitioned to do so by an interested
party. 93
In another change made by the Staggers Rail Act, if a protest
is received within thirty days after the application is filed, the ICC
must determine within forty-five days of that filing date whether an
investigation is needed to assist in determining what disposition to
make of the application. 94 The current statute also provides that if
the Commission decides that no investigation is to be undertaken,
the agency must make a decision on the abandonment application
itself within seventy-five days of the application's filing date. 95 If
the ICC concludes that the application should be granted, the
certificate permitting the abandonment must be issued within
ninety days from the date that the application was originally filed. 96
The statute further provides that if the Commission does conduct
an investigation, the process should be completed within 135 days
of the application's filing date with a decision to be rendered within
165 days. 97
One of the most significant changes made in the statute by the
Staggers Rail Act was the abolition of the hearing stage in the
Commission's consideration of abandonment applications. 98 The
previous statutory language provided that the ICC investigation
could include "public hearings at any location reasonably adjacent
to the railroad line involved in the abandonment [proceedings]." 99
The current language, however, states that the ICC shall merely
take into consideration the application of the rail carrier and "any
materials submitted by protestants."100  Parties opposing a
93. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10904(c)(1), (2), (3) (West 1981). The ICC has within its own discretion the
power to determine whether to undertake an investigation to assist in ascertaining what disposition
to make of the rail abandonment application. Id. This is in direct contrast to the language which was
contained in the former section, under which the ICC was mandated to conduct such an
investigation if a petition for it to do so had been received from an interested person. See 49 U.S.C.S.
5 109 0 4(c)( 1) (Law Co-op. 1979), amended by 49 U.S.C.A. S 10904(c)(1) (West 1981).
94. 49 U.S.C.A. § 109U4(c)(1)(West 1981).
95. Id. § 10904(c)(2).
96. Id.
97. Id. § 10904(c)(3).
98. Id. 5 10904(c)(1). This section provides that "ilf a protest is received within 30 days after
the application Ifor abandonmenti is filed, the Commission shall, within 45 days after the application
if filed, determine whether an investigation is needed to assist in determining what disposition to
make of the application." Id.
99.49 U.S.C.S. § 10904(c)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1979), amended by 49 U.S.C.A. § 10904(c)(1) (West
1981). Prior to the enactment of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, the language read as follows: "An
investigation may include public hearings at any location reasonably adjacent to the railroad line
involved in the abandonment ]proceeding. The hearing may be held on the request of an interested
party or on the initiative of the Commission." Id. The present statutory language provides only that
the ICC must take into consideration in determining whether a proposed rail line abandonment will
be consistent with the public convenience and necessity, "the application of the rail carrier and any
material submitted by protestants." 49 U.S.C.A. § 10904(c)(2) (West 1981).
100. Id.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
proposed abandonment of a rail line must advance their arguments
in the form of submitted documents, generally without the prospect
of accompanying oral presentations at a hearing forum.1'0 This
change from prior procedure effectively reduces the public visibility
of the abandonment application process with the prospect of less
press coverage and the maintenance of opponents to the
abandonment in less personal and less effective capacities.
Therefore, because of the ICC's ability to now bypass the hearing
phase in the Commission's administrative process with respect to
rail abandonment applications,10 2 the importance of effective
written and documented submissions in opposition to such
proposals has been heightened significantly.
IV. ICC EVALUATION AND DISPOSITION OF
ABANDONMENT APPLICATIONS
The ICC has exclusive and plenary authority over rail
abandonments.0 3 Therefore, parties desiring to block such carrier
proposals may look for relief only to the Commission and to courts
reviewing the ICC decisions.
A. PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY: BALANCING THE
INTERESTS
One concern for opponents of a proposed rail abandonment is
that they structure their administrative presentation to show that
such an abandonment would not meet the flexible standard of
"public convenience and necessity." Some assistance in
determining the meaning of this standard is provided by judicial
interpretation. The adaptable nature of the phrase in its application
101. See id. This section provides as follows:
If the Commission decides that no investigation is to be undertaken, the Commission
shall, within 75 days after the application is filed, decide whether the present or future
public convenience and necessity require or permit the abandonment or
discontinuance, taking into consideration the application of the rail carrier and any
materials submitted by protestants.
Id. Under section 1121.36(a)(1) ofthe Code of Federal Regulations, it is provided that "[ilnterested
persons may become parties to an abandonment or discontinuance proceeding by filing with the
Commission . .. written comments or protests." 49 C.F.R. 5 1121.36(a)(1) (1980). Such protestants
may request an oral hearing under the terms of section 1121.36(a)(l)(v), but it is within the
discretion of the ICC whether such a request will be granted, or whether particular protestants'
efforts in opposition to a rail line abandonment will be limited to written submissions. Id.
1121.,36(a)(l)(v).
1(2. 49 C.IF.R. § I 121. 3 6(a)(1)(v).
103. See Colorado v. United States, 27! U.S. 153 (1926) (ICC endowed by Congress with
exclusive jurisdiction in rail abandonment applications). ,Se also Chicago & N.W. Transp. v. Kalo
Brick & Tile Co.. 450 U.S. 311 (1981) (ICC has power to authorize abandonment of railroad located
wh oIll within one state).
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was referred to by the United States Supreme Court in a 1942 rail
abandonment case, ICC v. Railway Labor Association, ' 0 4 in which the
Court said the following: "The phrase 'public convenience and
necessity' no less than the phrase 'public interest' must be given a
scope consistent with the broad purpose of the Transportation Act
of 1920: to provide the public with an efficient and nationally
integrated railroad system.'" 0 5
Acknowledging the broad and flexible nature of the "public
convenience and necessity" standard, the United States Supreme
Court in Colorado v. United States0 6 developed the test to be
employed by the ICC. The Court emphasized that in deciding if a
proposed abandonment would satisfy public convenience and
necessity, the Commission must consider the needs of both
intrastate and interstate commerce, because it was the purpose of
the Transportation Act of 1920 to establish and maintain adequate
service for both. 0 7 Referring in more specific terms to the test to be
used by the ICC in dealing with abandonment applications, the
Court in Colorado asserted:
The benefit to one of the abandonment must be weighed
against the inconvenience and loss to which the other will
thereby be subjected. Conversely, the benefits to
particular communities of continued operation must be
weighed against the burden thereby imposed upon other
commerce. . . . The result of this weighing - the
judgment of the Commission - is expressed by its order
granting or denying the certificate.' 08
The test, therefore, is one of balancing the interests of the rail
carrier against those of the freight shippers and state and local
governments.
Public policy favoring abandonment of a particular rail line is
the desire for an efficient interstate rail system, free from the
burdens of unprofitable rail lines. ' 09 On the side of the shipper, and
the intervenor state and local governments, is the public interest
104. 315 U.S. 373 (1942).
105. ICC v. Railway Labor Ass'n. 315 U.S. at 376 (quoting The New England Divisions Case.
261 U. S 184, 189-91 (1923)).
106. 271 U.S. 153 (1926).
107. Id. at 166-69 (construing Transportation Act of 1920 ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456).
108. Id. at 168 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 169. The Court addressed the economic interest of a rail carrier seeking to maximize
profits stating that "the absence of earnings adequate to afford reasonable compensation are, of
course, relevant and may often be controlling. But the Act does not make issuance of the certificate
(lepeident upon a specific finding to that effect.'' Id.
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served when rail service is available for the furtherance of regional
economic development and sustenance of business operations,
which effectively could not survive without rail transportation. 10
Referring to these policy considerations, the Court in Colorado said
that the use of the balancing test shapes the Commission's
determination as "to what extent and in what manner intrastate
service must be subordinated in order that interstate service may be
adequately rendered." " '
1. Costs vs. Revenues and Reasonable Return on Investment
In making use of this flexible approach in its balancing
process, the ICC relies upon specific criteria set forth in regulations
it has promulgated. Virtually all of these regulations relate to
standards for determining costs, revenues, and rates of return on
investment for rail lines proposed for abandonment by carriers.
Traditionally, railroads have asserted the unprofitability of rail
lines as the primary justification for ceasing to operate them."I
When shippers and others have challenged such abandonment
applications, they have often challenged the carriers' characteriza-
tions of the lines' profitability. 113
The ICC did not adopt regulations for determining costs,
revenues, and investment return on rail lines until the Regional
Rail Reorganization Act of 1973.114 That Act created the
Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) and set forth a
mechanism for continuation of "[e]ssential rail service in the
midwest and northeast region[s] of the United States . . . provided
by railroads which are today insolvent . . .1."5 Thus, the
Commission began to maintain regulations to determine whether
the costs and revenues that are attributable to such service equal or
exceed the sum of the avoidable costs of providing the service plus a
"reasonable [rate of] return on the value of such rail prop-
erties. . ''1116
Although the mandate for the ICC to adopt regulations for the
110. Id. at 168-69. Referring to the adverse effects which would accrue to regions as a result of
rail line abandonments, the Court in Colorado provided that "[i]n some cases, although the volume of
the whole traffic is small, the question is whether abandonment may .justly be permitted, in view of
the fact that it would subject the communities directly affected to serious injury while continued
operation would impose a relatively slight burden upon a prosperous carrier." Id.
11. Id. at 166.
112. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Abandonment, 363 I.C.C. 115, 119 (1980). The ICC stated,
"Having concluded that the involved lines are being operated at a loss, we believe that the overall
financial strength of a railroad should not bar approving abandonment." Id.
113. See, e..., Saint Louis-San Francisco Ry. Abandonment, 328 I.C.C. 34, 40(1965).




determination of costs, revenues, and rates of return arose from a
situation in which Congress was referring specifically to bankrupt
railroads, the resulting regulations have been made applicable by
the Commission in all of its evaluations of rail line abandonment
proposals, whether the carrier is insolvent or earning a significant
profit overall.117 Pursuant to these regulations, 118 carriers applying
to the Commission for certificates permitting abandonment of rail
lines provide a detailed accounting of the costs, revenues, and
return on investment attributable to the route proposed for
abandonment. 1" 9 The reporting of costs sustained by the carrier
provide the basis upon which the ICC determines the "avoidable
costs" of the line - those costs the carrier definitely would not
incur if the line were taken out of operation. 0
a. Liquidation Value
In the further calculation of what would constitute a
"reasonable return''' 2 1 on the carrier's capital investment in the
particular line, ICC regulations provide that the profit gained
through operation of the property as a railroad is to be compared
with the "net liquidation value' '1 22 for the "highest and best
use' 23 of the property for nonrail purposes. This net liquidation
value is determined by computing the current appraised market
value of the property for other than rail transportation purposes,
less all costs of dismantling and disposition of improvements
necessary to make the remaining properties available for their
highest and best use while complying with applicable zoning, land
use, and environmental regulations. 124 The return on investment
factor is discussed in the text of the North Dakota Rail Aban-
donment Handbook:
In making a determination of an adequate return on
investment, the ICC does not consider the depreciated
117. See 49 C.F.R. § 1121.40 (1980). The ICC in its regulations makes the standard used in the
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 applicable in the review of revenue and rate of return
analyses for all rail carriers in the United States, regardless of the relative financial health of those
carriers. Id.
118. 49 C.F.R. §§ 1121.40-.47 (1980). These regulations are those within Subpart D of part
1121 - "Abandonment of Railroad Lines and Discontinuance of Service." Subpart D, entitled
"Standards for Determining Costs, Revenues, and Return on Value," sets forth the revenue and
costs which are attributable to particular branch lines. Id.
119. Id. 1121.40.120. Id. 11 21.40(a)(1). See also id. § 1121.42.
121. Id. S 1121.45.
122. Id. S 1121.44(c).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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book value of the line but rather the liquidation value of
the line. In many cases, the railroads have placed
extremely high values on the liquidation value of the line,
particularly the right-of-way. Because of the exaggerated
values placed on the investment, it is extremely difficult
for some branchlines to show even a nominal return on
investment. 125
As referred to in the above passage, a natural result of the carrier
determining the value of its property is inflation of the value of a
line.
b. Opportunity Costs
Also influencing whether a particular rail line provides a
reasonable rate of return on investment for the carrier has been the
ICC's use since December 26, 1979, of "opportunity costs" ' 126 in
reaching a decision on abandonment applications. The
Commission has decided whether "opportunity costs" incurred by
a railroad corporation in keeping rail assets tied up in less profitable
rail operations are proper criteria to consider in approving rail
abandonment applications. 127 Agencies from the states of Illinois,
Ohio, Minnesota, and South Dakota, as well as the National Grain
and Feed Association, expressed total opposition to the use of
opportunity costs as factors in abandonment proceedings. 128 These
125. NORTH DAKOTA HIGHWAY DEP'T & NORTH DAKOTA PUBLIC SERVICE COMM N, NORTH
DAKOTA RAIL ABANDONMENT HANDBOOK 12 (1981) [hereinafter cited as RAIL ABANDONMENT
HAN DBOOK].
126. Abandonment ofRailroad Lines - Use of Opportunity Costs, 360 I.C.C. 571 (1979). This was a
comprehensive statement of policy change issued by the Commission on December 26, 1979. The
ICC concluded in this document that opportunity costs were to be used in all future rail
abandonment proceedings as a factor to partially determine whether the public convenience and
necessity permit a proposed abandonment. Id.
127. 360 I.C.C. at 577.
128. Id. at 573. The Commission in its "Statement of Policy Change" acknowledged that the
State of Illinois, joined by the Illinois Commerce Commission, the Illinois Legislative Director for
United Transportation Union, the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT), and the
Minnesota Department of Transportation, the Ohio Rail Transportation Authority, the South
Dakota Public Utilities Commission and the National Grain and Feed Association all expressed
"total opposition to the use of opportunity costs as a factor in abandonment proceedings," Id The
ICC added:
These parties are concerned that if opportunity costs are made a factor the result will
be wholesale abandonment of profitable lines.
They stress the fact that railroads, as common carriers, occupy a unique place in
the corporate world. They believe that common carriers are not free to make decisions
regarding how and where to commit their resources based solely on the principle of
profit maximization.
Assuming an unfettered use of opportunity costs as a factor, it is argued that
carriers would be able to abandon operations if they could get a higher return by
investing assets elsewhere. Thus, a carrier receiving a 7-percent return on investment
on a branch line could argue that it should be able to abandon that line since it could
get a 10-percent return by investing in municipal bonds.
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agencies asserted that if the ICC began considering opportunity
costs, the result would be "wholesale abandonment of profitable
lines." ' 129 These protestants argued that under the ICC proposal,
even if a line was making a return on investment, the railroad
might be allowed to abandon the line if the railroad could obtain a
higher rate of return by investing its money elsewhere. 130
Despite this opposition the ICC found that "opportunity costs
must be a factor in determining whether the public convenience
and necessity permits abandonment." 3 ' The Commission
explained: "This finding reflects our belief that opportunity costs
are a real, and, in some cases, very significant factor in determining
whether the line at issue is imposing a burden on interstate
commerce."' 13 2 The ICC declined to state how determinative
opportunity costs would be in influencing the outcome of rail
abandonment proceedings. 133  A few months after this ICC
decision, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled in
Missouri Pacific Railroad v. United States 34 that opportunity costs
should be considered by the ICC in its review of an abandonment
application. 135
c. Reasonable Rate of Return on Investment: Is the
-Presence or Lack of It Conclusive in the ICC's
Determination?
One problem with the lines in North Dakota that have been
proposed for abandonment recently by the Burlington Northern
Railroad is that even if opportunity costs and the railroad's own
property value appraisal are used by the ICC, these lines in all
probability will not be shown to provide a "reasonable return" on
The statutory test in abandonment proceedings is whether the public convenience
and necessity permit abandonment. By focusing on maximizing carrier profits, these




131. 360 I.C.C. at 577.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 625 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1'980).
135. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. United States, 625 F.2d 178, 182 (8th Cir. 1980). In March of 1981,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also found that the ICC acted within its statutory power
when it issued its policy statement (360 I.C.C. 571) announcing its intention to consider opportunity
costs in future abandonment cases. See Farmland Industries, Inc. v. United States, 642 F.2d 208, 211
(7th Cir. 1981). In Farmland Industries, Inc. the court stated that the balancing approach long
approved in the line of cases extending from Colorado v. United States was not altered by the use by the
ICC of opportunity costs in the consideration of whether a particular branch line is profitable. Id.
The court in Farmland Industries concluded, "We find that this change in policy does not violate the
statutory mandate to authorize abandonment only when consistent with public convenience and
necessity.'" Id.
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the carrier's investment. 136 If a rail line is shown to return less than
a carrier would receive by abandoning service and liquidating or
transferring the assets of that line, does the ICC inquiry end there?
The answer is no. In its decision to permit consideration of
opportunity costs in abandonment proceedings, the ICC cautioned
that the question of opportunity costs is just one that will be taken
into account as the Commission balances the competing
interests. 137 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Missouri Pacific
acknowledged that the consideration of opportunity costs directed
by the Commission did not mean that there was any less
obligation on the ICC "to balance the relative weight of many
factors in determining whether or not to grant an
abandonment.' ' 38 Therefore, even if a railroad could make a
greater rate of return by abandoning a particular line, that is only
one consideration among many that are weighed by the ICC in
determining the merits of an abandonment application.
2. Operating at a Loss vs. The Lack of an Alternative for
Transporting Freizht
Another important question in the ICC's balancing test is
whether the ICC would conclusively abandon a line if it found that
the line was operating at a loss. The peculiar circumstances
surrounding each rail abandonment application placed before the
Commission are greatly determinative in the disposition of that
application.
Perhaps the Commission's justification for this practice is
founded upon the statement contained in Colorado, in which the
Court remarked that the Commission's determination in a rail
abandonment proceeding "involves an exercise of judgment upon
the facts of the particular case." 3 9 As the ICC itself maintained in
St. Louis - San Francisco Railway Abandonment, 140 "rtlhe point at
which abandonment shall be considered justifiable is a matter of
sound judgment and must be determined by the circumstances of
each case. 14' To the extent that the text of ICC reported decisions
have precedential value, however, there is administrative authority
for the position that under some circumstances a railroad can
136. See RAIL ABANDONMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 12.
137. See Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. at 153.
138. 625 F.2d at 180-81.
139. 271 U.S. at 166.
140. 328 I.C.C. 34(1973).
141. Saint Louis-San Francisco Ry. Abandonment, 328 I.C.C. 34, 40 (1973).
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properly be required to maintain operations on an unprofitable
line.
In Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad Abandonment' 42 a carrier
proposed to abandon a line because it had suffered continuing
deficits in its operation. 14 3 The railroad argued that continued
operation of the line would lead only to increased maintenance
expenses with no prospect of increasing the volume of traffic
moving on the line to the extent necessary to operate profitably. 144
The branch ran through a predominantly rural area where the bulk
of the commodities handled were agricultural. 145 Rail service in the
areas served by the line was necessary to enable shippers to remain
competitive, to handle the types of commodities involved, and to
avoid the use of inadequate roads. 146 Although the carrier's
financial condition was good, it asserted that continued operation
of the line would constitute a drain on its financial resources and be
detrimental to its system operations. 147  Responding to these
contentions by the railroad company, the ICC stated as follows:
[B]efore an abandonment of a line may be authorized, it
must be shown by the applicant that the losses to be
sustained from the continued operation of the line are so
large, when balanced against the extent of the traffic and
the public need for the continued operation of the line,
that the applicant may not justly be required to continue
to bear the financial loss necessarily entailed by the
operation. 148
The Commission denied the carrier's application to abandon
the line, maintaining that although the incurrence of losses was
142. 354 I.C.C. 422 (1973).
143. Gulf, Mobile & O.R.R. Abandonment, 354 I.C.C. 422, 430 (1973).
144. Id. The Commission incorporates its hearing examiner's findings into the official ICC
decision. As the hearing examiner stated and the ICC concurred, "Applicant here seeks to abandon
the involved branch primarily because of the comparatively small gross revenue derived from it, the
little use of it by shippers, the losses attributable to its continued operation and the adequacy of rail
and motor carrier service.' Id.
145. 354 I.C.C. at 431. The Commission, adopting its hearing examiners' findings, stated:
It (the line) traverses an area where a number of shippers, principally in the
agricultural and building-materials business, depend on the service. The volume of
business of a number of these concerns is increasing and a number directly depend on
rail service to the extent that corn-cob-shipping operations, a fertilizer-mixing plant
and lumber yards would be forced to cease doing business if they did not have
available the type of service provided by the applicant.
Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 430.
148. Id.
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significant, the magnitude of those losses had to be considered in
relation to the need for rail service and the carrier's ability to
continue adequate and efficient service. 149 The Commission
focused particularly upon the absence of a practical alternative to
the rail transportation provided by the line. As the opinion noted,
"the ability of a number of shippers to do business would be
seriously impaired because the cost of transportation by other
means would be considerably higher so as to render them
noncompetitive and would not be an adequate substitute for the
branch. "150
The rationale of the ICC in preserving rail service because of
the absence of a commercially feasible alternative mode of freight
transporation is particularly applicable to North Dakota's
situation. In the North Dakota State Rail Plan of 1980, thorough
study has been made of the possible effects that would result from
abandonment by railroads of lines identified as possible candidates
for an application to the ICC. The plan sought to measure the
impact of such abandonments on twenty line segments representing
almost 825 miles of track.151 A general policy set forth in the plan
provided that "North Dakota is heavily dependent upon the
railroads for its economic and social survival. Dependable and
adequate rail service is vital for the shipment of commodities and
natural resources. "152
The ICC has long recognized that sparsely populated states,
whose economies are centered primarily around agriculture, are
particularly dependent upon freight transportation by railroad. In
Missouri Pacific the Commission discussed the hardships under
which grain elevators would operate if they had no rail service. 153
The Commission asserted that continued operation of elevators on
branch lines that were abandoned would be impracticable. 154 On
another occasion the Northern Pacific Railway, a corporate
predecessor of the Burlington Northern, sought to abandon a line
in North Dakota. The Commission stated:
The record is clear that extreme hardships will be
imposed upon the elevator owners if the South Branch
were eliminated. Its importance to the grain producers
149. Id. at 431.
150. Id.
151. See Preface to STATE RAIL PLAN OF 1980, supra note 3.
152. Id. at 1-7.
153. Missouri Pac. R.R. Abandonment, 307 I.C.C. at 203-04.
154. Id.
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and the economy of the area cannot be disputed. We have
recognized in prior decisions that grain elevators operate
under severe hardship without rail service . . . and we
cannot find from the record that there is an adequate
substitute service to meet the transportation needs of the
area. 155
In Gulf one reason for the Commission's denying the application
for abandonment, even though the line was being operated at a
deficit, was that the shippers along its right-of-way were without a
practical freight transportation alternative. 156 Thus, the absence of
any reasonable options for transporting freight should be
significant as the Commission engages in its balancing of interests
in considering rail abandonment applications for North Dakota
lines. 157
The argument might be raised that provisions of the Staggers
Rail Act provide for public purchase or subsidy of rail lines
proposed for abandonment, 58 and that this represents a workable
means of keeping rail service on an unprofitable line. This
argument loses much of its credibility, however, within the
contemporary context of governmental budget cuts. In budget cuts
proposed by the Reagan Administration, the future of federal
participation in operating subsidies for light density freight lines is
dim. 159 The administration has taken the position that the
government should not encourage the retention of marginal rail
service, and officials have criticized subsidies to rail lines that are
likely to be abandoned at some future time. 160  Within this
governmental climate the absence of an alternative, as it applies to
North Dakota grain shippers, should be greatly determinative in
the disposition by the ICC of rail abandonment applications in this
state.
Besides the absence of a feasible transportation alternative, the
ICC in denying permission for abandonment in Gulf also placed
great weight on the relatively good overall financial condition of the
155. Northern Pac. Ry. Abandonment, 324 I.C.C. 750, 761-62 (1964).
156. Gulf, Mobile & O.R.R. Abandonment, 354 I.C.C at 43 1.
157. See STATE RAIL PLAN OF 1980, supra note 3, at 1. The 1980 North Dakota State Rail Plan
and its 1981 Update and Appendices provide line-by-line assessments of the expected impacts on
shippers along certain Burlington Northern branch lines if the railroad is granted a certificate of
public convenience and necessity to cease operations on them. See 1981 RAIL PLAN UPDATE, supra
note 53. The projections contained in the State Rail Plan as amended in 1981 show that some lines
targeted for eventual abandonment by the Burlington Northern will cause relatively significant
adverse effects in the areas they service, while the impact from the loss of rail operations on some
others would be comparatively minor. See STATE RAIL PLAN OF 1980, supra note 3, at 111-2, 3.
158. 49 U.S.C.A. S 10905 (West 1981).
159. TRAFFIC WORLD, FEB. 16, 1981, at 16.
160. Id.
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carrier. 161 The Commission declared that the line being operated
at a loss was not conclusive because the magnitude of the loss
should be viewed together with the need for the rail service and the
ability of the carrier, based on its fiscal condition, otherwise
adequately to provide quality service for its entire system. 161
Since . the decision in Gulf, however, the ICC has been
inconsistent in determining whether the overall financial condition
of a particular rail carrier is dispositive in the balancing process.
In Georgia Northern Railway Abandonment 63  the Commission
maintained that even though the petitioning carrier was an
"immensely successful and profitable enterprise,'' 164 it would be
"wasteful of applicant's resources for it to continue to operate this
line of railroad."1 65 In two subsequent abandonment decisions the
ICC did attach great importance to the carriers' financial
conditions in permitting them to abandon lines.166 In 1980, in
Baltimore and Ohio RailroadAbandonment, 167 the ICC declared that the
carrier's financial condition was significant, but in Norfolk and
Western Railway Abandonment168 it asserted that the carrier's fiscal
status was of no consequence. In both cases the ICC permitted the
carrier to abandon the rail line. 169
3. Operating at a Loss as a Taking Without.Just Compensation
A further question relating to the permissibility of requiring a
carrier to continue deficit operations on a particular line is whether
such a requirement would be prohibited under the fifth amendment
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for public use
161. 354 I.C.C. at 431.
162. Id.
163. 354 I.C.C. 436 (1976).
164. Georgia N. Ry. Abandonment, 354 I.C.C. 436, 444 (1976).
165. Id.
166. See Chicago & N.W. Transp. Abandonment, 354 I.C.C. 1 (1977). The Commission stated,
"We do not believe . .. considering . . the changed circumstances ofC & NW's (Chicago & N.W.)
financial position, that the applicant may justly be required to continue to bear the loss necessarily
sustained by operation of the lines." Id. at 8. In Chicago & N.W. Transp. Abandonment, 354
I.C.C. 121 (1977), the Commission stated, "Considering ... the poor financial condition of the C &
NW system . + . we do not believe that the applicant should be required to continue to bear the loss."
Id. at 126. See also Baltimore & 0. R.R. Abandonment, 360 I.C.C. 681 (1980). The Commission
permitted a proposed rail line abandonment citing the "bleak financial picture forecast for B & 0
operations.- Id. at 683. But see Illinois-Central Gulf R.R. Abandonment, 360 I.C.C. 1 (1978). The
Commission stated that the mere fact that the line proposed for abandonment made a profit in the
preceding fiscal year "did not mandate denial of the application. " Id.
167. 360 I.C.C. 681 (1980). The Commission stated in .justifying approval of the abandoment
application that "Ithe proposed abandonment will significantly reduce the drain on the B & O's net
operating income" and that this was important given "the bleak financial picture forecast for B &
O's operations." Id. at 683.
168. 363 I.C.C. 115, 119 (1980). The Commission asserted that they "believe that the overall
financial strength of a railroad should not bar approving abandonment.'" Id.
169. See Illinois-Central Gulf R.R. Abandonment. 360 I.C.C. 681 (1980); Norfolk & W. Ry.
Abandonment, 363 I.C.C. 115 (1980).
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without .just compensation. 17 0
Since the enactment by Congress of the Transportation Act of
1920,11 federal power to regulate commerce has been used to limit
the freedom of carriers to abandon rail lines in interstate
commerce. In the first related case decided by the United States
Supreme Court after the enactment of the Transportation Act,
Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission, 172 a Louisiana logging
railroad, which was losing approximately $1,500 a month, had
been compelled by the Railroad Commission of Louisiana to
continue operations despite this loss. 1 73 The Brooks-Scanlon Court
held that the Act preempted state authority in the entire field of rail
abandonment, 7 4 and that a carrier "cannot be compelled to carry
on even a branch of business at a loss, much less the whole business
of carriage."1 7 5 Brooks-Scanlon involved a proposal by the carrier to
end all service rather than that on only one line, however, and the
above-cited passage has been criticized by commentators as being
more sweeping than was warranted by the facts of the case or
indeed as the Court itself intended., 76
Less than five years after Brooks-Scanlon was decided, the Court
modified the broad contention that a carrier could not be compelled
to carry on operations when to do so would cause it to incur a
financial loss.' 7 In Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Bourland178 the
Court proclaimed that "fal railway may be compelled to continue
the service of a branch or part of a line, although the operation
involves a loss. . . .This is true even where the system as a whole
fails to earn a fair return upon the value of the property. '1 79
Essential to the underlying rationale in Fort Smith Traction Co. was
that railroads by their nature were corporate entities imbued with
the public interest and their owners at times had to make sacrifices
because of that fact. ' 80
This concept was also expressly recognized in railroad rate
cases decided by the Supreme Court following Brooks-Scanlon. 181 In
170. U.S. CoNSI. amend. V.
171. Pub. L. No. 91-152, ch. 91, SS 400-405, 41 Stat. 456, 474-79.
172. 251 U.S. 396 (1920).
173. Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 251 U.S. 396, 397 (1920).
174. 251 U.S. at 400.
175. Id. at 399.
176. See Note, Conrail and Liquidation Value, 85 YALE L.J. 371, 383 n.43 (1976).
177. Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Bourland, 267 U.S. 330 (1925).
178. 267 U.S. 330 (1925).
179. Id. at 332-33.
180. Id. at 332.
181. See Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456 (1924) (a railroad is not
entitled as of constitutional right to more than a fair operating income upon the value of its
properties); The New England Divisions Case, 261 U.S. 184 (1923) (ICC may require some carriers
to change lower freight rates, thus limiting their profits, when other carriers permitted to charge
higher rates had higher operating costs).
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one line of rate cases a "net loss" standard was accepted by the
Court in situations in which there was no confiscation for fifth
amendment purposes. In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. United States182
the court held that "[s]o long as a railroad is not caused by such
regulations to lose money on its over-all business, it is hard to think
that it could successfully charge that its property was being taken
for public use 'without.just compensation.' ''183
The "net loss" test for confiscation was deemed applicable to
abandonment proceedings in Northwestern Pacific Railroad v. United
States. 184 The railroad challenged an ICC order denying its request
to abandon a portion of rail line."18 The court ruled per curiam and
said the following:
[W]e hold that no confiscation results from an order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission denying the
abandonment of rail services which are shown to be
unprofitable, as long as there is no net loss to the over-all
system. . . . IT]he question is actually one of degree . . .
of profits as opposed to over-all net loss. 186
The determination of which deficit rail operations are by their
nature so vital as to justify their continuation on branch lines is to
be made within the balancing test enunciated in Colorado v. United
States. 187 A United States District Court described this weighing
process again in Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal v. United States. 188
The Brooklyn Eastern court found that no "taking" within the
meaning of the fifth amendment had occurred with an ICC
mandate that a carrier continue deficit operations over a particular
line. 18 9 The court explained:
'The decision of whether an order to continue a service or
a facility is unreasonable requires consideration of the loss
as one factor, but also requires taking account of the
relation of the particular service or facility to the whole
service that the carrier has undertaken or is bound to
182. 345 U.S. 146 (1953).
183. Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. United States, 345 U.S. 146, 148 (1953) (footnote omitted).
184. 228 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
185. Northwestern Pac R.R. v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Cal.) (three-judge
court) (per curiam), aff'd per curiam sub nor. Northwestern Pac. R.R. v. ICC, 379 U.S. 132, reh'.
denied, 379 U.S. 984 (1964).
186. 228 F. Supp. at 694 (emphasis added).
187. 271 U.S. 153(1926).
188. 302 F. Supp. 1095 (ED.N.Y. 1969) (three-judge court).
189. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 1095, 1104 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
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render, the public service value of continuance of the
service or facility, and any other factors that contribute to
a determination of whether the service or facility and its
losses can be considered in isolation from the rest of the
public service involved.... 190
It seems clear, therefore, that the ICC may compel a railroad to
engage in deficit operations over a particular branch line without
violating the fifth amendment as long as the carrier's enterprise as a
whole is profitable.
The United States Supreme Court has even sustained the
validity of compelled rail operations on the part of rail carriers who
have been in the midst of bankruptcy and reorganization
proceedings. In the case of the New Haven Railroad, a large carrier
of passengers and freight in Southern New England, the Court
forced the trustee of the company to continue operations from the
commencement of reorganization proceedings in the middle of
1961 until the railroad's inclusion in the Penn Central
Transportation Company in 1969.191 The justification for this
compelled operation of the debtor railroad was that the public
interest, including the needs of freight shippers and rail
commuters, and the corresponding effects on the region's
economy required it.192 During that seven-year period, losses
attributable to these deficit rail operations eroded the debtor's
estate in excess of sixty million dollars. 193 In the Penn Central Merger
Cases'94 the Court acknowledged the losses that had been suffered
by the corporate entity, but stressed the extent to which rail service
is vital in terms of public need:
"[it is a fundamental aspect of our free enterprise
economy that private persons assume the risks attached to
their investments, and the NH creditors can expect no
less because NH's properties are devoted to a public
use. "
* * * While the rights of the bondholders are entitled
to respect, they do not command Procrustean measures.
They certainly do not dicate that rail operations vital to
the nation be jettisoned despite the availability of a feasible
190. Id. at 1101.
191. See New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 490 (1970) (discussion of the compelled
continued operations of the New Haven Railroad).
192. See Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 510-11 (1968) (discussion of the public
interest rationale behind the compelled operation of the New Haven Railroad).
193. 399 U.S. at 490.
194. 389 U.S. 486 (1968).
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alternative. The public interest is not merely a pawn to be
sacrificed for the strategic purposes or protection of a class
of security holders whose interest may or may not be
served by the destructive move. 195
From this statement, it appears that the Supreme Court linked the
absence of a practical alternative for rail service to confiscation of
property under the fifth amendment. In discussing this policy the
Court asserted that the absence of an alternative was a crucial
factor in its determination that a taking under the fifth amendment
guarantee had not occurred. The Court cautioned, however, that
continuing deficit operations of a bankrupt railroad may not be
carried on indefinitely without constituting an erosion and
impermissible taking of a debtor railroad's estate. 196
Considering the Court's policy in this area, compelled
operation of small branchlines of a large and profitable carrier,
such as the Burlington Northern, in no way raises a valid
confiscation argument. The ICC could still indicate, however, that
as a matter of policy it does not favor any rail line that is not paying
for itself. But this rationale would ignore the emphasis placed upon
the need for continuing rail service in circumstances in which
proportionately significant segments of the regional business
community have no alternative to rail service for shipping and
receiving materials vital to their operations.
4. Failure to Maintain Lines: Cutting Costs or Strengthening the
Case for Abandonment
As the ICC engages in its general balancing process under the
standards enunciated in Colorado, the Commission often hears the
argument from protestants of proposed abandonments that the
petitioning carrier has disregarded maintenance to the extent that
operations over the right-of-way are either greatly hindered or are
impossible altogether. 197  Many opponents of abandonment
applications have claimed that a carrier, eager to rid itself of a line
showing little or no profit, has conspired to defer maintenance on
the line in order to use the line's poor condition as further evidence
for abandoning the route. Certainly some of the lines in North
Dakota most recently proposed for abandonment by the Burlington
195. Id. at 510-11 (quoting Pennsylvania -R.R. -Merger -New York Cent. R.R., 331 I.C.C.
643, 704 (1967) (emphasis added).
196. See New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392 (1970).
197. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Transp. Co. Abandonment, 363 I.C.C. 105 (1980).
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Northern are lines that have fallen into a degree of disrepair. The
railroad will undoubtedly use this as partial justification for
proposing that the lines be abandoned.1 98 According to the North
Dakota State Highway Department, the Burlington Northern has
indicated that in addition to the criterion that a particular line
produce a rate of investment return comparable to other properties
of the company, a line must be capable of carrying loaded 100-ton
hopper cars at speeds of at least twenty-five miles per hour. 199
The deliberate downgrading argument, however, is difficult
for a protestant to prove in a rail abandonment proceeding before
the ICC. In Southern Pacific Transportation Abandonment 00 the
opponents of a proposed line abandonment accused the carrier of
deliberately downgrading service on the line in order to strengthen
its case for abandonment. The ICC found that the evidence on the
administrative record did not support the "serious allegation" of
deliberate downgrading: "We do not equate the use of minimum
expenditure because of light use of the line with deliberate
downgrading. . . . In sum, we are of the view that the line's
continued losses and minimal traffic impelled SP to minimize on
maintenance and we see nothing wrong with that effort." 201 The
ICC provided a similar analysis in another 1980 decision, Norfolk &
Western Railway Abandonment, 202 and declared as follows:
The losses resulting from the operation of the lines offer a
logical and justifiable explanation of N & W's policy of
deferred maintenance over these lines, rather than any
alleged deliberate downgrading of the line. A lack of
profitability on a line is a valid reason for deferring
maintenance on a line. 20 3
In Chicago North Western Transportation Abandonment204 the
Commission stated that evaluation of a deliberate downgrading
allegation should include consideration of four factors: the nature
of the service and the public need shown in the past for the service;
the effect of the carrier act; the need demonstrated by a carrier to
economize under the implied intent test; and any evidence as to a
specific intent to deliberately downgrade for the purpose of turning
198. See STATE RAIL PLAN OF 1980, supra note 3; 1981 STATE RAIL PLAN UPDATE, supra note 53.
199. See RAIL ABANDONMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 3.
200. 363 I.C.C. 105 (1980).
201. Southern Pac. Transp. Abandonment, 363 I.C.C. 105, 109-10 (1980).
202. 363 I.C.C. 115(1980).
203. Norfolk & W. Ry. Abandonment, 363 I.C.C. 115, 119 (1980).
204. 354 I.C.C. 292 (1977).
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what would be a profitable operation into a deficit operation in
perfecting a case for abandonment. 20 5 Given these standards by the
ICC it is almost impossible for a protestant to show deliberate
downgrading of a line by a carrier. Thus, the deliberate
downgrading issue, insofar as it might be used by opponents to
Burlington Northern's forthcoming rail abandonments in North
Dakota, is virtually a dead one.
Perhaps the deliberate downgrading question could be raised
with the ICC by shippers and state and local governments in
opposition to an anticipated abandonment before an abandonment
application for a particular line is actually filed. The Commission
hinted at this possibility in Southern Pacific Transportation when it
remarked as follows in the 1980 decision: "Moreover, we are
impressed by the fact that charges of [deliberate] downgrading only
come at a time when abandonment is being considered. 206
Thus, for shippers along a route which is under study for
possible future abandonment, 20 7 a potential strategy in opposition
might be to raise the question of deliberate downgrading at a
relatively early date prior to the making of the actual application by
the carrier. The increased credibility that would possibly be gained
for a future contest of an abandonment application might be
significant enough to cause members of the ICC to consider the
deliberate downgrading issue with more attention.
C. THE ICC's RECENT RECORD IN ABANDONMENT CASES
The ICC within the past few years has seemingly adopted a
policy of declining to deny any abandonment application submitted
by a carrier. 208 Nevertheless, rail carriers are still required by
statute to obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity in
order to abandon any rail line, 20 9 and the ICC under the rule set
forth in Colorado is obligated to balance the respective interests and
base its determination upon what "fairness to all concerned
demands. "210 By failing to seriously balance these opposing
205. Chicago& N.W. Transp. Abandonment, 354 I.C.C. 292, 302 (1977).
206. 363 I.C.C. at 109.
207. 49 C.F.R. § II21.20(c)(3)(1980).
208. See, e.., Chicago & N.W. Transp. Abandonment, 354 I.C.C. 1 (1977); Baltimore & 0.
R.R. Abandonment, 360 I.C.C. 681 (1980); Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Abandonment, 360 I.C.C. 1
(1978): Norfolk & W. Ry. Abandonment, 363 I.C.C. 115 (1980).
209.49 U.S.C.A. 10903 (West 1981).
210. 271 U.S. at 169.
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interests, the Commission provides the basis for possible reversal
by a circuit court of appeals. 2
11
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE ICC DECISION
The prospects of success for those contesting proposed rail line
abandonments are anything but bright at the administrative level,
in view of the decisional record of the ICC over the past two years.
From August 1, 1979, through August 31, 1981, the Commission
approved every abandonment application that was filed. 12 The
granting of these certificates of public convenience and necessity
involved 330 different cases encompassing the abandonment of
8,726 miles of track nationally. 2 3 The North Dakota State High-
way Department described the "attitude of the present ICC
members ' 21 4  to be such that ICC treatment of abandonment
proposals had evolved into a tremendously pro-industry process.2 1 5
The Commission has adopted the position that if the rail industry is
to better its profit picture and generate a greater return on
investment dollars, railroads must be permitted to abandon any
line that returns little or no profit. 216 A result of this ICC policy has
been that carriers petitioning to abandon lines have been granted
certificates after merely showing that such lines were operating at a
loss, 2 17 even though by statute the burden of proving public
convenience and necessity is placed squarely on the shoulders of the
211. SeeCity of Cherokee v. ICC, 641 F.2d 1220, 1220-30(8th Cir. 1981).
212. The recent decisional record of the ICC in abandonment cases was cited by the appellees in
their reply brief filed with the United States Supreme Court. See Brief for Respondent at 10, ICC v.
City of Cherokee, 102 S.Ct. 387-88 (1981), denying cert. to 641 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir.). In the
respondent's brief, the following reference was made to the ICC's recent treatment of abandonment
applications:
The I.C.C. during the 25-months period August 1, 1979 through August 31, 1981,
has approved every abandonment application, and has reversed every ALI that dared
deny an application. This has embraced 330 cases involving 8,726 miles of line. This is
a record of unblemished support for the railroad industry, and is inconsistent with
prior practice, when abandonments on occasion were denied. Cherington, Charles,
The Regulation of Railroad Abandonments, 100-101 (Harvard, 1948); Conant, Michael,
Railroad Mergers and Abandonments, 114 (Univ. of Calif., 1964). An occasional court




214. RAIL ABANDONMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 13.
215. RAIL ABANDONMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 13.
216. See Brief of Petitioner at 10-12, ICC v. City of Cherokee, 102 S.Ct. 388 (1981), denying cert.
to 641 F. 2d 1220 (8th Cir.).
217. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Abandonment, 366 I.C.C. 1 (1981); Baltimore & 0.
R.R. Abandonment, 360 I.C.C. 681 (1980); Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 363 I.C.C. 690 (1980);
Norfolk & W. Ry. Abandonment, 363 I.C.C. 115 (1980); Texas & Pac. Ry. Abandoment, 363
I.C.C. 666 (1980); Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Abandonment, 360 I.C.C. 1 (1978); Chicago & N.W.
Transp. Co. Abandonment, 354 I.C.C. 1 (1977).
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carrier. 218 Since ICC policy greatly favors granting virtually any
abandonment application, the most logical source of relief for
shippers and others opposing line abandonments is the judicial
review provided by an appellate court.
Under United States Code provisions 219 a party adversely
affected by an order of the ICC may seek an injunction or a setting
aside of that order by petitioning either the federal court of appeals
in the circuit in which the petitioner has its principal office, or in
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 220 The court of
appeals to which the petition is filed has exclusive jurisdiction over
the process of either enjoining, setting aside, or affirming an ICC
order. 22 1 Direct appeal of a final ICC decision to a circuit court of
appeals was provided for in a 1975 amendment to the United States
Code, 222  whereby three-judge federal district courts were
eliminated as review panels for ICC decisions. 223
A petitioner from an ICC decision may also apply to the
circuit court, prior to the hearing of the case on its merits, for
injunctive relief to postpone ICC action pending completion of the
judicial review. 224 Obtaining such injunctions may be particularly
important now that the procedural modifications in the Staggers
Rail Act 225 require the Commission to render a decision on an
abandonment application within 165 days of the date of its filing.
22 6
The most important consideration for those challenging ICC
approval of a carrier's abandonment application is the substantive
'judicial review to which the Commission's decision will be
subjected. Like most federal agencies, the ICC is governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act, 227 and the reviewing circuit court
218.49 U.S.C.A. 1 i0904(d)(1) (West 1981).
219. 28 U.S.C.A. g 2321(a) (Weit 1978). This section provides that "a proceeding to enjoin or
suspend, in whole or in part, a rule, regulation, or order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
shall be brought in the court of appeals .. " Id. Under section 2343, the venue for such a
proceeding is "the judicial circuit in which the petitioner resides or has its principal office, or in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit." Id. § 2343.
220. Id. §§ 2321(a), 2343.
221. Id. § 2342. This section provides that with respect to all rules, regulations, or final orders of
the ICC, the court ofappeals "has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in
part), or determine the validity of " such rules, regulations, or orders. Id.
222. Pub. L. No. 93-584, §§ 5, 7, 88 Stat. 1917, 1918 (1975) (eliminating three-judge district
court procedure for review of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission). See 28 U.S.C.A. §
2342 (West 1978). See also Chemical Leaman Tank Lines v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 721 (D. Del.
1978). In Leaman Tank Lines the court stated that the overriding purpose of the 1975 change in the
statute was to eliminate the three-judge district courts as administrative review panels over ICC
decisions. Id. at 724.
223.28 U.S.C.A. %2342 (West 1978).
224. 5 U.S.C.A. § 705 (West 1977). See, e.g., Illinois v. ICC, No. 81-2520, slip op. at 1 (7th Cir.
Nov. 27, 1981) (order denying application for interlocutory injunction), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W.
3716 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1982) (No. 81-1299).
225. Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980).
226.49 U.S.C.A. § 10904(c) (3) (West 1981).
227. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (current version at 5
U.S.C.A. §§551-559, 701-706 (West 1977)).
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must therefore comply with the restricted judicial review set forth
by statute. 228 Pursuant to general statutory description, the court
may set aside decisions rendered by administrative agencies which
are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion" 229 or "in excess
of statutory jurisdiction, authority ' 230  or "unsupported by
substantial evidence.' '231
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently ruled
against a proposed rail abandonment, which had been approved by
the ICC in City of Cherokee v. ICC 2 32 In Cherokee an application was
submitted by the Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company for
permission to abandon its ninety-six mile line from Cherokee, Iowa
through Minnesota to Sioux Falls, South Dakota. 233 The railroad's
application was initially heard by an ICC administrative law judge,
who denied the abandonment for two reasons: train crew wages
were not costs that were avoidable upon abandonment when a
collective bargaining agreement required that wages be paid even if
the line was abandoned; and, most importantly, in balancing
the benefit of the service to the public against the burden upon the
railroad, the scale tipped in favor of the public. 234 The railroad
appealed the decision to the Commission itself, however, and the
ICC, while essentially adopting the judge's factual findings,
reversed her order and granted the abandonment. 235
The Eighth Circuit acknowledged at the outset that the scope
of its review of an order of the ICC, although narrow, was
sufficiently flexible to enable the court to "review the entire record
and carefully examine the Commission's conclusions to determine
whether its findings are supported by substantial evidence in the
record as a whole, and whether proper legal standards were
correctly applied. "236
In effecting this review of the ICC decision the court found
that one dispositive issue was whether the Commission properly
balanced the interests of the carrier against the competing interests
of the affected communities before it authorized abandonment of
the rail line. 237 The court cited the relevant portion of the Interstate
228. 5 U.S.C.A. S 706 (West 1977).
229. Id. S 706(2) (A).
230. Id. S 706(2) (C).
231. Id. S 706(2) (E).
232. 641 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 387-88 (1981).
233. City of Cherokee v. ICC, 641 F.2d 1220, 1223 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 387-88
(1981).
234. Id. at 1223-25.
235. ld. at 1225-26.
236. Id. at 1226-27.
237. Id. at 1227. The court stated that the two issues presented were "whether the Commission
correctly included train and engine crew wages as 'avoidable costs' in granting ICC's application for
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Commerce Act, which provides that a rail carrier maintaining
transportation subject to ICC jurisdiction may abandon a line only
if the Commission finds that present or future public convenience
and necessity require or permit the abandonment and
discontinuance.2 38  The court also cited the provision in the
abandonment statute that directs the ICC, in making this finding
of public convenience and necessity, to "consider whether the
abandonment or discontinuance will have a serious adverse impact
on rural and community development." 2 39 The court emphasized
that under this provision of the Act the Commission must balance
the benefits and burdens of abandonment that are "ultimately
distributed between the carrier, the protestant communities and
shippers, and interstate commerce generally. "240 Employing the
directives of Colorado v. United States2 4t and the language of the
abandonment statute itself, 242 the City of Cherokee court held that
maximization of resources and profits should not be the sole
determinative factor relied upon by the ICC in determining
whether to grant the abandonment.2 43
The Court criticized the ICC for stating in substance that if a
carrier could not operate the branch line profitably, and it could
increase profits by abandoning the line and selling its property
holdings, the abandonment would be permissible. 244 The Court
asserted:
abandonment, and whether the Commission properly balanced the interests of the carrier and the
affected communiti~s before it authorized abandonment." Id.
238. Id. (citing 49 U.S.C.A. § 10903(a) (West 1981)).
239. Id. (citing 49 U.S.C.A. § 10903(a) (West l9tsl)).
240. Id. at 1227-28,
241. 271 U.S. 153 (1926).
242.49 U.S.C.A. § 10903(a) (West 1981).
243. 641 F.2d at 1229-30. The court in City of Cherokee stated the following:
The ALJ [ICC administrative law judgel recognized that if the line were abandoned
and all the properties sold, the money thereby realized could be invested in a more
lucrative market, and the ICG would realize a significant return on its capital
investment in the Sioux Falls District Line. She did not believe, however, that this
factor should necessarily be determinative of the entire case. She correctly reasoned
that Congress intended this factor to be measured against the burden that
abandonment would impose on the affected communities and shippers. 49 U.S.C. §§
10903-10905. The Commission stated in substance that if the carrier could not operate
the branch line as a profitable going concern (and if it could turn a greater profit
through abandoning the line and selling its property holdings), then abandonment
would be permissible.
The AL was right and the Commission was wrong. Congress did not intend for
the Commission to authorize abandonment of particular rail lines solely because the
carrier's capital investment in the line could be mort profitably put to work elsewhere.
Congress intended that the Commission determine the degree and severity of the
benefits and burdens which abandonment would occasion to all affected parties. The
Commission does not have the authority to modify the measuring mechanism
mandated by Congress.
244. Id. at 1229.
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Congress did not intend for the Commission to authorize
abandonment of particular rail lines solely because the
carrier's capital investment in the line could be more
profitably put to work elsewhere. Congress intended that
the Commission determine the degree and severity of the
benefits and burdens which abandonment would occasion
to all affected parties. The Commission does not have the
authority to modify the measuring mechanism mandated
by Congress. 24 5
Remanding the case to the ICC, the court directed the Commission
to "properly balance the benefits and burdens that would inure to
both the carrier and the communities ' 24 6 in the event of either the
abandonment or continuation of operations over the line in
question.
Instead of acquiescing to continued ICC proceedings as a
result of the reversal and remand by the Eighth Circuit, the
railroad petitione d the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari. 24 17 The ICC then petitioned independently 248 to the
Supreme Court for review of the Eighth Circuit
decision in City of Cherokee, and the railroad lobbying group, the
Association of American Railroads (AAR), 249 filed an amicus
curiae brief in support of the ICC and Illinois Central Gulf
Railroad petitions for certiorari. Treating the independent
petitions by the railroad and the ICC as a singular case, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 13, 1981 .250
The attempts by Illinois Central Gulf and the ICC to have the
Eighth Circuit decision in City of Cherokee reversed are significant for
two reasons: the unwillingness of the railroad to participate in
futher ICC proceedings consistent with the Eighth Circuit decision;
and the impact that the railroad and the AAR in its amicus brief
claimed would stem from the City qf Cherokee decision. 251 Both the
245. Id. at 1229-30.
246. Id. at 1230 (emphasis in original).
247. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. City of Cherokee, 102 S. Ct. 387 (1981), denyin cert. to 641 F.2d
1220 (8th Cir.).
248. ICC v. City of Cherokee, 102 S. Ct. 388 (1981), denying cert. to 641 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir.).
249. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Association of American Railroads at 2, Illinois Cent. Gulf
R.R. v. City of Cherokee, 102 S. Ct. 387-88 (1981), denying cert. to 641 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir.). The
Association describes itself in its amicus curiae brief as, "a voluntary, unincorporated, non-profit
organization composed of member railroad companies operating in the United States, Canada, and
Mexico." Id. The AAR described its activities as including, "research, operations, car service,
public relations, accounting, statistics, law, and federal legislation and regulation, insofar as those
matters require joint handling in the interest of safe, adequate and efficient railroad service to the
public." Id.
250. 102 S. Ct. at 387-88.
251. Brief for Petitioner, 102 S. Ct. 387-88 (1981), denying cert. to 641 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir.). In its
brief the railroad stated the following:
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Illinois Central Gulf and the AAR asserted in their briefs that the
holding in City of Cherokee would make it far more difficult in the
future for railroads to be granted permission by the ICC to
abandon rail lines. 252 The petitioners also attacked what they
perceived to be the Eighth Circuit's impermissible limitation on the
ICC's exercise of administrative expertise and discretion in
determining whether a particular rail abandonment should be
granted. 25
3
The respondents, in arguing for a denial of certiorari, conclud-
ed that the Eighth Circuit properly found that the ICC had erred in
weighing only the burden to Illinois Central Gulf of continued
operation of the line, the benefit to the railroad of abandonment, and
the burden to the public of discontinuance.2 54 The respondents
argued that the ICC, in failing to also include in this balancing the
benefit to the public of continued operation of the line, did not
sufficiently balance all benefits and burdens of the proposed
abandonments. 25 5 The respondents cited Colorado v. United States, 1
56
in which the court declared that "ftjhe benefit to one of
abandonment must be weighted against the inconvenience and loss
to which the other will thereby be subjected. "257
In approving 330 straight rail abandonment'cases the ICC
has not undertaken such a thorough balancing but instead has
looked to what it perceived to be a national transportation policy set
by Congress as the determinative factor in abandonment
dispositions. 25 8  In City of Cherokee the ICC asserted that
Review by this Court of the decision below is particularly important in light of' the
serious adverse impact which this decision would have on the nation's railroads and on
rail service to the public. Studies show that in 1976 railroads lost more than $150
million annually (not considering opportunity costs) in operating uneconomical light-
density lines outside the Northeast. Railroads which have received permission to
abandon lines have realized substantial savings. Yet, if the decision of the majority of
the panel of the Court of Appeals is allowed to stand, abandonments will be far more
difficult for railroads to obtain - despite the clear intent of Congress to the contrary
when it enacted new abandonment provisions in 1973 and 1976 and, most recently, in
the Staggers Rail Act of 1980. . . . If railroads are forced to maintain uneconomical
branch lines, service to the public on existing lines will deteriorate and shippers will
turn to other modes of transportation - thus frustrating the national goal of energy
self-sufficiency. The decision below jeopardizes not only other Commission decisions
in abandonment cases pending in the courts of appeals on review, but also other
abandonment applications presently pending before the Commission.
Id. at 21-23.
252. Id. at 21-23; Amicus Curiae Brief'of the Ass'n of American Railroads at 9, 102 S. Ct. 387-
88 (1981). denyin4gcert. to641 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir.).
253. Briefof Petitioner at 26. 102 S. Ci. 387-88 (1981). denyinLacp'rt, to 641 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir.).
254. Brief of Respondent at 13-14, 102 S. Ct. 387-88 (1981), denyinqcert. to 641 F.2d 1220 (8th
Cir.).
255. Id. at 14.
256. Id. at 14 (citing 271 U.S. 153 (1926)).
257. 271 U.S. at 168.
258. Se Brief of Petitioner at 9-12. 102 S. Ct. 387-88 (1981). dnin4 cert, to 641 1.2(1 1220 (8th
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congressional intent was to ensure that as an overriding
consideration, rail operations which would "weaken the system as
a whole" should not be compelled. 25 9 This assertion by the ICC
parallels the position of the railroad industry, as the AAR stated in
its amicus curiae brief in City of Cherokee, that the Eight Circuit
decision "seriously impairs the discretion and powers of the
Commission in abandonment cases and poses a serious threat to the
financial viability of the Nation's railroads, which as a whole are
already in anemic financial condition. "260
Although the profitability of a line is to be included in the
ICC's balancing of interests under the Colorado v. United States test,
it was never intended by Congress to be the governing factor. As
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce began
holding hearings on what initially was referred to as the Railroad
Deregulation Act of 1979261 and eventually was enacted as
the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Committee Chairman .James .1.
Florio stated at the outset that "deregulation poses many dangers.
In a headlong rush to save the railroads, we cannot prescribe
disaster for any particular region or any . particular
industry.' '262
The initial bill, H.R. 4570, was also introduced by
Representative Harley 0. Staggers. This bill proposed deleting
from the rail abandonment statute the requirement that in
considering an abandonment application the ICC consider
whether the abandonment or discontinuance shall have a
serious, adverse impact on rural and community development. 263
H.R. 4570 proposed much weaker language providing that
the ICC could permit abandonment if it determined that the
benefit to an applicant carrier from abandonment, including
liquidation of a line's assets, exceeds the detriment to opponents
"taking into account any impact the abandonment or
discontinuance may have on rural and community
development. ' ' 264 In addition, H.R. 4570 included a provision
259. Id. at 9.
260. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Ass'n of American Railroads at 4, 102 S. Ct. 387-88 (1981),
denying cert. to 641 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir.).
261. The Railroad Deregulation Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 4570 Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and
Commerce of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
262. Id. at I (comments of Rep. Comm. Chairman.Iames. J. Florio).
263. H.R. 4570, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 132(a)(1) (1979).
264. Id. § 132(a)(2)(C). This bill proposed the weaker language in H.R. 4570 Section
132(a)(2)(C), whereby the ICC would have been required to permit a rail line abandonment if it
determined that "the benefit to the applicant carrier from abandonment or discontinuance,
including any benefit arising from the ability to put capital used on the line or service to other
railroad use, exceeds the detriment to the objecting party and others similarly situated from loss of
service, taking into account any impact the abandonment may have on rural and community development. ' Id.
(emphasis added).
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whereby approval for a proposed abandonment would be
automatic if the carrier could demonstrate that revenues
attributable to a particular line "do not meet or exceed the full cost
of operating the line or service." ,265 The changes proposed by H.R.
4570 that would have altered the standards under which the ICC
would evaluate rail abandonment applications were never
enacted. 266 During the hearings which followed the introduction of
the Railroad Deregulation Act of 1979 in the form of identical
House and Senate bills, H.R. 4570 and S. 796, opposition was
expressed with respect to the proposed changes in the abandonment
statute.267 Shippers and state governmental agencies criticized the
proposals in H.R. 4570 and S. 796 as going too far in
accommodating the interests of the railroad industry in maximizing
profits while leaving shippers and communities virtually powerless
to contest abandonment applications. 268 The Subcommittee on
Transportation and Commerce of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce held hearings on H.R. 4570
from April 24, 1979, through November 1, 1979,269 with the
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation conducting hearings on
the identical bill, S. 796, during the same time period. 270 After
much opposition was registered to various aspects of the bills,
which also provided for extensive deregulation in other subject
areas, the bills were kept from general vote in both Houses of
Congress. 27 1  In late November of 1979, modified railroad
deregulation bills, H.R. 7235 and S. 1946,272 were introduced.
These contained substantial changes from H.R. 4570 and S. 796,
265. Id. 5 132(a)(2)(B).
266. See Railroad Deregulation Act of 1979: Hearin.es on S. 796 Before the Subcomm. on Suface
Transportation qf the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing's on S. 795).
267. See S. REP. No. 470, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979).
268. See Senate Hearings on S. 795, supra note 266, at 1208-09. Donald L. Jacka .Jr., Assistant
Secretary of Agriculture for the State of Kansas, described S. 796 as follows:
The bill attempts to further ease the railroads' ability to abandon lines. The
tranditional "public convenience and necessity" test for abandonment cases will be
retained under this bill; however, if the railroads can prove a financial difficulty on the
line, then the Interstate Commerce Commission must approve the abandonment. The
bill has allowed in this profit/loss calculation an opportunity cost or profit to be derived
by the railroads. By formally including opportunity costs in the determination of
profit/loss the railroads will be able in the future to abandon not only losing lines but
also marginally profitable lines.
Id. at 1301.
269. Hearings on H. R. 4570 Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and Commerce of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreqn Commerce, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
270. Senate Hearinges on S. 795, supra note 266.
271. See H.R. REP. No. 1430, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); S. REp. No. 470, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979).
272. S. REP. No. 470, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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which had died in committee.
The provisions of S. 1946 relating to rail line abandonments
were eventually incorporated into H.R. 7235, which initially had
not proposed any changes in the abandonment section of the
Interstate Commerce Act.2 73  The final committee report
accompanying S. 1946 explained that although the abandonment
provisions of the bill were designed to accelerate the time frame for
ICC processing of abandonment applications, "[nlo changes are
made in the standards under which the ICC decides whether or not
to grant the abandonment of railroad lines. "274 Therefore,
although Congress clearly had ample opportunity to delete the
requirement that the ICC consider "whether the abandonment or
discontinuance will have a serious, adverse impact on rural and
community development, ' 275 it chose not to. 27 6 This is the only
requirement that the ICC is expressly mandated to consider in its
balancing of competing interests as it considers an abandonment
application.
Given the clearly demonstrated intent of Congress to have the
ICC consider specifically rural and community adverse effects from
a proposed abandonment, the Commission must be able to find
that the corresponding burden on interstate commerce in keeping
the line in operation must outweigh the detriment to rural and
community development. It must be noted that the Supreme Court
in Colorado emphasized that the ICC issues a certificate of public
convenience and necessity permitting an abandonment "not
primarily to protect the railroad, but to protect interstate commerce
from undue burdens .... ",277 Referring to the massive body of
273. H.R. REP. No. 1430, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 50-52 (1980).
274. S. REp. No. 470, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1979). The committee report stated:
The abandonment provisions of this bill are designed to accomplish two major
objectives: significantly reducing the time spent processing such cases at the
Commission and improving the process by which abandoned lines can be subsidized.
No changes are made in the standards under which the ICC descides whether or not to grant the
abandonment of railroad lines.
Id, (emphasis added). The committee report then elaborated:
As noted above, while section 202(b) will provide much faster processing of
abandonment cases, the standards under which the ICC decides whether or not to
approve an abandonment would remain unchanged. Along these same lines, the
Committee adopted an amendment during its consideration of S. 1946 to delete
language which was viewed by some as limiting the right to protest abandonments.
This reflects the Committee's intent to significantly speed up the decision process without chang'ing
the standards involved or the standing of the parties in abandonment cases.
Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
275.49 U.S.C.A. § 10903(a) (West 1981).
276. See S. REp. No. 470, 96th Cong., I st Sess. 39-40 (1979).
277. 271 U.S. at 162.
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statistical data that the AAR bombarded Congress with as it
considered railroad deregulation, 278  the committee report
accompanying S. 1946 on its way to passage recognized that the
well-publicized plight of the bankrupt eastern railroads absorbed
into Conrai 2 79 was not shared by all carriers, particularly those in
western states. The report stated as follows "In reciting such facts,
the temptation is to run up the danger flag over the entire railroad
industry. It should be pointed out that the railroads . . . are not in
uniformly desperate financial straits.' "280
With a 1981 consolidated net income of 272.2 million dollars,
up twenty-two percent over the 1980 figure, Burlington Northern is
truly a prosperous railroad. 28 1 As such, the burden on the
Burlington Northern of maintaining service on a particular branch
line is insignificant in comparison with the pervasive adverse effect
that abandonment of such a route would have on a rural region
with small communities dependent upon rail transportation for the
economical transportation of agricultural commodities. Perhaps
not every one of the line abandonments proposed by the Burlington
Northern would cause rural and community effects of sufficient
severity so as to justify the compelled deficit rail operation by a
carrier. Nevertheless, other branch lines in danger of being
abandoned are vital to rural communities and elevators in North
Dakota because of remote location, poor access to major highways,
and distance from other rail lines to be continued in operation. 282
When a particular line proposed for abandonment does have this
profile, however, it should be argued that because of the great need
by the communities and region and the corresponding minimal
revenue drain on a large and prosperous carrier such as the
Burlington Northern, the railroad should be denied permission to
abandon the route, even when continuation of operations can only
be carried on at a loss.
With the Eighth Circuit's 1981 decision in City of Cherokee, the
Commission's recent policy of routinely approving abandonment
applications has been shown to be vulnerable when the ICC has
failed to legitimately balance adverse effects to rural and
community development against the revenue-cost consideration of
278. S. REP. No. 470, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1979).
279. Id. at 3. The railroads forming Conrail are the Penn Central, Erie Lackawanna, Reading,
Jersey Central, Lehigh Valley, and the Lehigh and Hudson. Id.
280. Id.
281. SeeTRAFFIC WORLD, Feb. 1, 1982, at 79.
282. See STATE RAIL PLAN OF 1980, supra note 3; 1981 STATE RAIL PLAN UPDATE, supra note 53.
While cessation of service on some of these lines would bring minimal adverse impact, the opposite
would be true in the event of abandonment of other routes.
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the carrier. 283 ICC administrative law judges have already begun to
cite City of Cherokee as authority for placing greater weight on factors
other than the carrier's revenues and costs on a particular line.
2 84
Perhaps most significantly, City of Cherokee now provides a sound
foundation upon which protestants may base their arguments in
seeking judicial review of ICC decisions granting rail
abandonments.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Burlington Northern Railroad, and indeed other rail
carriers in the nation, can be expected to pursue aggressive line
abandonment policies for the foreseeable future. This course will in
turn place great pressure upon communities and shippers
dependent on such threatened freight transportation. The
procedural changes in the abandonment application process
brought by the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 also make it necessary for
protestants to move quickly in effecting their opposition.
It is now clear, however, that in considering abandonment
applications, the Interstate Commerce Commission must
specifically include in its balancing the adverse effects which an
abandonment would bring to rural and community development.
Without legitimate consideration of this factor in the weighing
process, the ICC fails to adhere to the true intent of Congress, and
causes such a defective abandonment disposition to be vulnerable
upon judicial review.
DAVID C. THOMPSON
283. SeeCity of Cherokee v. ICC. 641 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 387-88 (1981).
284. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Abandonment, ICC No. AB-431 (Sub.-No. 58) (April
15, 1981); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Abandonment, ICC No. AB-18 (Sub.-No. 35F) (May 4, 1981);
Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Abandonment, ICC No. AB-43 (Sub.-No. 71F) (June 4, 1981).
In the first rail abandonment decision rendered by the ICC on one of the current generation of
Burlington Northern applications in North Dakota, the Commission on January 29, 1982, partially
denied the carrier's petition. In Burlington Northern R.R. Abandonment, No. AB-6 (Sub.-
No. 104F), .Jan. 29, 1982, the Commission denied Burlington Northern permission to abandon 14
miles of its York to Dunseith line extending from York to Wolford, N.D. Id. at 11-13. While the ICC
did allow the railroad to abandon the remaining portion of the 41-mile line, id. at 1, the Commission
cited City of Cherokee v. .C. in its decision as it ordered continuation of operations over the 14-mile
segment. Id. at 3 (citing City of Cherokee v. I.C.C., 641 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981)). In this decision,
the ICC stated that it must strike a balance "between the potential harm to affected shippers and
communities which would result from abandonment and the present and future burden which
continued operations would impose on the carrier and interstate commerce .... " Id. at 11.
With respect to the question of opportunity costs, the Commission acknowledged that if this
factor was included, operation of the 14-mile segment from York to Wolford, N.D. would be carried
on at a loss. Id. at 13. The ICC added that "Ithe Commission has stated that opportunity cost is just
one of many factors that must be taken into consideration in determining whether abandonment is
Justified. Merely because a railroad could earn greater revenues by investing its assets elsewhere does
not mean that the public convenience and necessity requires abandonment." Id. The I.C.C.
explained its decision to require Burlington Northern to continue operations over the 14-mile
segment, stating the following: "[Wle believe that the protestants have met their burden in
demonstrating that retention of the York to Wolford segment is in the public interest. Any burden on
the railroad from continued operation is outweighed by the harm of abandonment on shippers and
the community." Id.

